

Ocean Policy Studies

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A Comparative Study of Application of Ecosystem Approach to Marine Living Resource Management and its Implications for Japan

Ayako Okubo*

Abstract

Ecosystem approach has been recognized as an important concept for sustainable development and incorporated in various international conventions and action plans. However, there is no internationally standardized definition or principles of ecosystem approach. This article analyzes how the ecosystem approach has been incorporated in marine living resource management at international, regional and national level. Based on such comparative analysis, we can find many components which are commonly used under ecosystem approach such as conservative and precautionary catch limits of target species, regulation of bycatch of non-target species, countermeasure against discarding, stronger regulations on IUU(illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishery, flexible setting of operation area or no-take area for specific fishing practices, etc.. A general trend to improve existing management measures with ecosystem considerations is also identified. Based on case studies, this article provides some policy implication for Japanese fisheries diplomacy. For example, it can be said that the idea of “culling” predator species, such as marine mammals, under the concept of ecosystem approach would be hardly accepted in international negotiation arena. It is necessary to investigate practical measures under ecosystem-approach in regional and national policy frameworks in order to promote international consensus on marine living resource management, especially in high seas.

Key words: Ecosystem approach, marine living resource, fisheries management, sustainable development, fisheries diplomacy

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Estimating Air Pollution Eco-Costs of Domestic Transport Facilities

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Abstract

Freight transportation firms are to a large degree responsible for cost reductions. And in Japan, truck transportation plays a large role in the domestic logistic network. However, recently the logistic network which is excessively dependent on trucking, has caused urban problems such as air pollution, traffic jams, accidents and discordant noises. The social costs of trucking have thus begun to receive more scrutiny and policies that attempt improvement of the situation are being advanced. Emission control of automobiles is such an example.

When a government argues for a modal shift policy in domestic logistics, it is necessary to consider not only the costs in moving from one transport mode to another, but also the social cost of the transport facility. This study estimates the air pollution cost, which is included in the social cost of the transport facility, especially the impact of NO_x (NO_2) on healthy residents in the areas in question. In estimating the costs, it targets the cities of Tokyo, Chiba, Yokohama and Kawasaki. Through many areas for improvement remain, the analysis focuses on NO_x emissions by trucks in the central areas of big cities, as well as on waterways relatively far from population centers.

Key words: social cost, logistic network, modal shift, air pollution

Maintaining Security in the Exclusive Economic Zone by Coastal States

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Abstract

Coastal states have the authority to regulate development, preservation and management of natural resources, protection of marine environments, management of artificial islands, and scientific research operations in the exclusive economic zone. However, the importance of the maintenance of "security" in the exclusive economic zone has increased against the backdrop of maritime terrorism and the frequent occurrences of crime in recent years. The purpose of this study is to examine whether coastal states are able to enforce security measures and carry out policing activities in their efforts to maintain security in the exclusive economic zone. Analysis of Article 56 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and state practice confirms that many coastal states recognize the importance of maintaining security in the exclusive economic zone and are thus taking appropriate measures to achieve such.

Key words: Exclusive economic zone, Coastal state, Security

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A Profitability Evaluation of Marine Mineral Resources in the EEZ

Area of the Okinotorishima

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Abstract

The Okinotorishima is a barren, coral island located in the southern-most region of Japan. In this sense, this small island is absolutely essential to our country that provides the southern-most base point for the EEZ of Japan. The government of Japan has therefore tackled the management issues on this island, e.g. execution of reclamation project, development of fishing field, utilization of ocean thermal energy, construction of lighthouse, etc. However, the marine mineral resources, in particular, have not been surveyed systematically. Those efforts made in the past regrettably failed to give us a clear perspective of the island. In this study, a qualitative and profitability analysis of the marine mineral resource deposits in the EEZ area of the island was carried out, hopefully to offer a suggestion for the Government to organize effective measures for the maintenance of the island.

Key words : Okinotorishima, ocean mineral resources, seamount, exclusive economic zone

*The University of Tokyo

Presence and Credibility: Homeporting the USS Midway at Yokosuka*

Tetsuo Kotani*

If the U.S. wants Japan's opinion as to whether the U.S. should base a carrier in Japan or not, or wants Japan's agreement, the Prime Minister authorized me to say Japan would support the U.S. plan.-Funada Naka, Speaker of Japan's House of Representatives¹

Key words: aircraft carriers, extended deterrence, visits to Japan by nuclear-powered warships, introduction of nuclear weapons, maritime strategy

Introduction

Yokosuka, located at the mouth of Tokyo Bay, is the only foreign port at which the U.S. Navy has homeported its aircraft carriers. The USS *Midway* (CV 41), which arrived in 1973, was the first to be based there. The American carrier strike group at Yokosuka remains an integral part of Japan's national security system and a contributor to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.² Tokyo and Washington jointly announced in October 2005 that a *Nimitz*-class nuclear-powered carrier would replace the USS *Kitty Hawk* (CV 63), the last conventionally powered carrier of the U.S. Navy, and the USS *George Washington* (CVN-73) did so in September 2008.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the strategic significance of the carrier deployment at Yokosuka during the Cold War by recon-

structing the history of the homeporting of the USS *Midway*. Scholars have paid little attention to this episode in the history of Japan-U.S. relations so far, probably because it was overshadowed by the reversion of Okinawa and the normalization of Japan-China relations. The lack of archival resources might be also a factor. Scholarly works have treated this subject in piecemeal fashion.³ This article will not only enrich the history of Japan-U.S. relations but also provide a basis for reassessing the value of continued carrier deployment in Japan, in the context of dramatic change in the postCold War East Asian strategic environment.

My basic finding is that homeporting the USS *Midway* at Yokosuka increased the credibility of U.S. extended deterrent over Japan and served as a bridge between the U.S. nuclear umbrella and Japan's non-nuclear policy.

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*Ocean Policy Research Foundation

1. Murata Kōji interview with James Auer, March 1996, National Security Archive U.S.-Japan Project Oral History Program <www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/japan/auerohinterview.htm> (acc. 31 July 2004).
2. The USS *Midway* was replaced by the USS *Independence* (CV 62) in 1992, and it in turn was replaced by the USS *Kitty Hawk* in 1998.
3. Agawa Naoyuki, Umino Yūjō: Beikoku kaigun to Kaijōjietai (Maritime friendship: The U.S. Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force) (Tokyo, 2001), chap. 6; Umebayashi Hiromichi, *Kūbo Middowee to Nihon* (USS *Midway* and Japan) (Tokyo, 1991); and Nagao Hidemi, *Nihon Yōsaika no Shinario* (A scenario of fortifying Japan) (Tokyo, 2004).

The credibility of the American nuclear umbrella was undermined in the 1960s by the emergence of China as a nuclear power and subsequent U.S. pursuit of a non-proliferation regime. While Japanese leftist organizations vehemently demonstrated against port calls by U.S. nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable warships, Japanese security planners continued to rely on the American nuclear umbrella while promoting a non-nuclear policy. The carrier group based at Yokosuka was integrated into Japanese security system though the 1978 Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines. The homeporting of the nuclear-armed USS *Midway* at Yokosuka led to the effective and efficient use of the carrier task group which provided both rapid response and nuclear retaliation capabilities.

The most sensitive issue in carrier homeporting in Japan was the fact that the ship was nuclear-capable. While the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty requires prior consultation regarding the introduction of nuclear weapons, one of Tokyo's publicly proclaimed three non-nuclear principles prohibits the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. However, the American and Japanese governments avoided prior consultation, based upon a 1960 understanding that distinguished between "introduction" and "transit" of nuclear weapons, and they ultimately agreed upon homeporting. In public, Tokyo stated that there was no introduction of nuclear weapons because Washington had not called for prior consultation; Washington said that it would not act against Japanese will. Opinion polls showed that most Japanese did not trust those statements. More importantly, neither did the Soviet Union. That is why, ironically, homeporting the USS *Midway* in

Japan strengthened the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence.

The first section of this article examines two key nuclear issues in Japan-U.S. relations: port calls of nuclear-powered vessels and the introduction of nuclear weapons aboard ships. The second section explains the concept of overseas carrier homeporting. The third section reconstructs the decision-making process of homeporting the *Midway* in Japan. The article's final section assesses the strategic meaning of homeporting the USS *Midway* at Yokosuka.

The Two Nuclear Issues in Japan-U.S. Relations

Big ships carrying nuclear-capable aircraft and fast, nuclear-powered submarines which could fire ballistic missiles from underwater were the most important postnWorld War II additions to the U.S. Navy. After the war, airmen alleged that long-range bombers armed with atomic bombs made naval forces obsolete. Sailors retorted by proposing that strategic bombers be supplemented by large carriers operating air wings that could carry atomic bombs. The first postwar secretary of defense, James Forrestal, succeeded in funding the construction of the first supercarrier, the USS *United States*. But his successor, Louis Johnson, who was determined to enlarge the Air Force and trim the Navy, halted its construction. In the "revolt of the admirals," naval officers denounced Johnson's policy. The dispute over who should carry atomic bombs came to a virtual end during the Korean War when Johnson was replaced and defense spending skyrocketed.

In 1951, the Navy began construction of the first *Forrestal*-class supercarrier. The construction

of *Enterprise*-class and *Nimitz*-class nuclear-powered supercarriers followed in 1961 and 1975, respectively. These ships continued the traditional attack-and-support task in war, and in peacetime they served as goodwill ambassadors. They took on the new mission of nuclear counterattack by carrying the Skyhawk (A-4), Intruder (A-6), Corsair (A-7), and Phantom (F-4) nuclear-capable aircraft for use in the event of a Soviet preemptive nuclear strike. The U.S. Navy has maintained at least one carrier task group in the Mediterranean and one in the Western Pacific since 1946 and 1950, respectively.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy also developed nuclear-powered submarines and sea-based ballistic missiles. After the first nuclear-powered submarine, USS *Nautilus* (SSN 571) got underway in 1955, the Navy built a solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the Polaris, to be launched from submarines.⁴ In 1960, one of the first ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), the USS *George Washington*, launched the first Polaris missile from underwater. The U.S. Navy subsequently developed the Poseidon and Trident missiles. During the 1970s, the U.S. Navy maintained forty-one SSBNs. Remaining undetected, these boats armed with multiple-warhead (MIRV) missiles became the most reliable deterrent for the United States.

While America's European allies accepted the presence of U.S. landbased nuclear deterrents, Washington's Asian allies never openly permitted them on their soil. Instead, the Americans deployed a less visible, sea-based deterrent in Asia. Accordingly, two nuclear issues became controversial: port calls of

nuclear-powered warships and the introduction of ship-based nuclear weapons in the soil and waters of Asian allies. The debate over these issues became especially strong in Japan due to its citizens' "nuclear allergy."

Nuclear-powered warships enjoy special privileges in foreign ports and waters under international law. Under the U.S.-Japan security arrangement, the host government has limited rights to restrict their port calls.⁵ The U.S. Navy first considered nuclear-powered submarine visits to Japan in 1959, but the State Department rejected the idea as premature pending a revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. When the Americans raised the subject during Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato's visit to Washington in June 1961, Japanese officials replied that their public must first be "educated" so as to distinguish between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Nothing happened until January 1963, when Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer agreed with a Defense Department official that the time had come to renew the request to Japan.⁶

The Japanese government responded favorably, but such an attitude posed a "serious dilemma" for the American government. In February, Tokyo announced that it was considering a U.S. request for regular visits by nuclear-powered submarines, that such a request was consistent with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and that it would honor the request. But Tokyo needed to investigate the question of public safety and liability in case of accident, and it asked for information to make its own "safety evaluation." While willing to provide

4. E. B. Potter, ed., *Sea Power: A Naval History*, 2d ed. (Annapolis, Md., 1981), chap. 31, 369-70.

5. The Japanese government rejected the port call by the NS *Savannah*, the first U.S. nuclear-powered merchant ship, in 1957 due to insufficient liability provisions.

6. Hilsman to Rusk, 11 June 1963, JU00238, Digital National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter cited as DNSA).

all possible assistance to Tokyo so that nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) visits might be accepted, Washington replied that legal, security, and policy regulations prohibited disclosure of information about the ships' reactors. Nonetheless, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson argued that Tokyo's request for more information, if handled appropriately, represented a "potential watershed" in Japanese attitudes toward defense in nuclear age.⁷

In order to open the way for an SSN visit to Japan, Washington provided an aide-memoir to Tokyo which summarily answered various questions which Japan's Nuclear Energy Commission had raised. This was the "best" the Americans could do to reassure Japan, on one hand, and to preserve their own national security interests, on the other hand.⁸ On 24 August, Washington also sent Tokyo an official statement which would covering the operation of its nuclear-powered warships while in foreign ports and cover the operations of its nuclear-powered warships in foreign ports and waters. Washington also promised Tokyo 24-hour advance notice of SSN visits and accepted environmental monitoring by the Japanese government. Tokyo then announced its acceptance of SSN visits, saying that it was now convinced of the safety of the vessels in acceptance of SSN visits, and that they were engaged in the defense of Japan under the Security Treaty.⁹

The USS *Sea Dragon* (SSN 584) visited

Sasebo on 12 November 1964, three days after Prime Minister Satō Eisaku assumed office. Given the change in Japan's government, the Foreign Ministry asked Washington to rearrange the ship's schedule. The White House approved its visit if that was acceptable to the new prime minister. Although tens of thousands rallied against the *Sea Dragon's* port call, the United States was encouraged by the response of an "increasingly mature and sophisticated Japanese public."¹⁰

The *Sea Dragon's* visit had strategic implications as well. It occurred just after China's October 1964 nuclear test. Beijing protested informally, and Moscow repeatedly warned that visits by nuclear-powered submarines would "pave the way" for the introduction of atomic weapons into Japan and affect the peace and security of the Far East. But Tokyo firmly rejected such accusations.¹¹ The nuclear-powered submarine's visit to Japan demonstrated that the United States would continue to go about its business, in concert with an ally, in a serious and responsible way. Although SSNs did not carry nuclear weapons, their visits might be construed as reassurance to the Japanese and as a source of anxiety for potential aggressors because they demonstrated that Japan had an ally equipped with atomic weapons at a time when China became a nuclear power.

SSNs continued to visit Japan with some frequency. Visits to Sasebo became routine

7. Rusk to Embassy Tokyo, 6 June 1963, JU00236; U. Alexis Johnson to Gilpatric, 22 June 1963, JU00243, *ibid*.

8. State 9706, Rusk to Embassy Tokyo, 20 Jan. 1964, no subject, JU00296, DNSA.

9. Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, Monthly Newsletter, 9 (1964), <www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/ugoki/geppou/V09/N09/196417V09N09.HTML>.

10. Kitchen to Thompson, 6 Nov. 1964, JU00359; Tokyo 97, Reischauer to Department of State, 14 Nov. 1964, JU362, DNSA.

11. JU00359; Airgram A-1161, Tokyo to Department of State, 12 Feb. 1963, JU00209, DNSA; Response from the Japanese Government to the Statement of the Soviet Union Regarding the Visits by U.S. Nuclear-Powered Submarines to Japan, 27 Oct. 1964, Database "The World and Japan" <www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19641027.O1J.html> (acc. 31 Jan. 2008).

and successful, while those to Yokosuka, which was more desirable due to its superior repair facilities, were not considered so. Yokosuka port calls were more sensitive because of its proximity to large population concentrations. The USS *Snook* (SSN 591) was the first nuclear-powered submarine to visit Yokosuka in May 1966. Two years later, the Japanese monitoring system detected higher than normal amounts of radioactivity in Sasebo after a visit by the USS *Swordfish* (SSN 579). With sensational media coverage and elections pending in Japan, both governments agreed not to resume SSN visits until the Japanese monitoring system was improved. Washington also accepted Tokyo's request for U.S. ships to take additional safeguards.¹²

While the "immediate reason" for SSN visits was the operational requirement for logistic support, the longer range political reason was to involve Japan increasingly in U.S. Far East defense posture. Port calls by the Seventh Fleet to Japan were "highly visible demonstrations of the close political relations" between the United States and Japan.¹³ SSN visits also had the net advantage of educating the Japanese public about nuclear weapons. While the first met strong opposition, subsequent ones attracted fewer demonstrators and were accepted as an accomplished fact.¹⁴

In the meantime, negotiations on visits to Japan by nuclear-powered surface ships (NPSSs) moved slowly. Both governments

found it difficult to agree on the wording of an aide-memoire for such port calls. Proposed visits in late 1966 to Sasebo by the USS *Long Beach* (CGN 9) and to Yokosuka by the USS *Enterprise* (CVN 65) and the USS *Bainbridge* (CGN-25) in early December were postponed, pending completion of another aide-memoire.¹⁵ There were three main issues about their visits: the safety of nuclear reactors, the introduction of nuclear weapons, and their linkage with Vietnam.¹⁶ After the Diet session adjourned in October 1967, Washington sent an aide-memoire assuring Tokyo of the ships' safety as it had earlier for SSNs. Tokyo responded by announcing its acceptance of NPSS visits in November of the same year.

The USS *Enterprise* was then set to visit Sasebo on 20 January 1968. But the target date was leaked, and U.S. Embassy Tokyo proposed moving the visit up a few days so as to catch opponents, including the "militant" Zengakuren (National Federation of Students Self-Government Associations), "off guard." Accordingly, the ship called at Sasebo on 18 January. The American embassy in Tokyo initially estimated the risk as "not negligible" but "tolerable." It subsequently suggest that opponents stirred more adverse reaction to the visit than expected, partly because the police treated the opposition "with unnecessary roughness," thereby creating a "Japanese against Japanese" situation. The embassy was "not optimistic" about another *Enterprise* visit

12. U.S. Pacific Command History, 1967, 129-30; *ibid*, 1968, 143-44 (Hereafter cited as PCH); JU362, DNSA.

13. Action Memo, Farley and Berger to Under Secretary of State, 22 Jan. 1968, JU877, DNSA.

14. Kurosaki Akira, Kakuheiki to Nichi-Bei Kankei: Amerika no Kaku Fukakusan Gaikō to Nihon no Sentaku 1960-1976 (Nuclear weapons and Japan-U.S. relations: U.S. nonproliferation policy and Japan's choice, 1960-1976) (Tokyo, 2006), 206.

15. 1967 PCH, 129; 1966 PCH, 95-96.

16. Tsuji Ichizō, *Chinmoku no Minato* (A silent port) (Sasebo, 1972), 157-58.

soon, because the ship was big and a symbol of involvement in Vietnam and nuclear weapons.¹⁷

Nevertheless, by the late 1960s, the legal and political foundations for subsequent American nuclear-powered and atomic-armed ship visits to Japan had been laid. Under the 1952 Security Treaty, Japan had no right to interfere with American military operations in and out of its territory. That prompted opposition figures to criticize Tokyo for giving a "blank check" to U.S. forces, and some Japanese feared being drawn into an American-instigated war in the Taiwan Strait, Indochina, or the Korean peninsula. Partially in response, the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1960 introduced a system of prior consultation regarding "major changes" in the deployment of U.S. forces in Japan or directly from the country in support of combat operations meant to assure the security of the Far East. This system clearly recognized Japanese sovereignty, even though Okinawa was not included until its reversion in 1972.

But Washington argued that visits by nuclear-powered warships were not subject to prior consultation. The American government interpreted its statement, in the joint Japan-U.S. communiqué of January 1960, denying any intention of acting in a manner contrary to Japanese wishes concerning prior consultation as exempting nuclear-powered warship visits from such.¹⁸ The State Department thought

references to the 1960 document would make it easier for the Japanese government to accept SSN visits, because they did not carry nuclear weapons.¹⁹

But port calls by carriers and other surface ships were another matter. Washington had hoped to obtain an explicit understanding with Tokyo to the effect that visits by American warships and/or aircraft carrying nuclear weapons were not subject to a Japanese veto. Tokyo, however, preferred "obscure" language so as not to provoke opposition in the Diet to the "transit" of nuclear weapons. Japanese leaders subsequently stated publicly that even such transit was subject to prior consultation. That prompted Ambassador Reischauer to approach Foreign Minister Ōxhira Masayoshi in April 1963 to reconfirm what Washington regarded as the permissive language of the 1960 joint communiqué.²⁰

The 1960 assurance together with the tacit understanding enabled the Japanese government to proclaim a broad and seemingly clear policy with regard to the introduction or transit of nuclear weapons. While in fact Tokyo and Washington had finessed their differences over when prior consultation might be required, in public the Japanese government held that it could deny the introduction of nuclear weapons if the Americans had not asked for prior consultation. That followed, in Tokyo's view, from Washington's assurances that the United States would not act against Japan's will. Thus on 30 January 1968,

17. Tokyo 4179, U. Alexis Johnson to CINCPAC, 22 Dec. 1967, JU00863; Tokyo 4763, Johnson to Secretary of State, 17 Jan. 1968, JU00876; Tokyo 5586, Johnson to Secretary of State, 13 Feb. 1968, JU00891, DNSA.

18. Joint Communiqué of Japanese Prime Minister Kishi and U.S. President Eisenhower, 19 Jan. 1960, Database "The World and Japan." <www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19600119.D1E.html> (acc. 31 July 2004).

19. State 4745, Rusk to Embassy Tokyo, 9 July 1963, JU00247, DSNA.

20. Tokyo 2335 to Secretary of State, 4 Apr. 1963, JU00223, DNSA.; Report "Limitations on Use of US Forces in Japan," enclosed in memo for Maj. Gen. Wickham from LTC F. King, 26 Aug. 1974, subject: USS Midway Court Martials, Eapr-Policy, folder: USS Midway-1974, RG 330, Office of the Secretary of Defense Records, National Archives (NA), College Park, Md.

twelve days after the *Enterprise* visited Sasebo, Prime Minister Satō Eisaku proclaimed the four pillars of Japan's nuclear policy: three non-unclear principles, nuclear arms reduction, dependence on U.S. nuclear deterrent, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Now, as Tokyo saw it, Japan's anti-nuclear posture was not inconsistent with its protection under the American nuclear umbrella.

The Concept of Homeporting Carriers Overseas

President Richard Nixon inherited a weakened American position in the international arena from Lyndon Johnson. Under the concept of "mutual assured destruction" (MAD), American superiority in strategic weapons declined to virtual parity with the Soviet Union. Shifts in the conventional weapons balance favored Moscow. Fighting a war in Vietnam without sufficient financial resources and manpower weakened the United States strategically vis-à-vis its great adversary, the Soviet Union, and economically vis-à-vis its allies, West Germany and Japan. At home, the combined effects of war and inflation ate away at the national will.

Growing Soviet power meant that the United States would be less able to provide a credible deterrent for its friends and allies. The challenge for President Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, was, therefore, how to delay, offset, or reverse the greater Soviet power while restructuring political and economic relations with friendly nations. The administration's top priority was

disengagement of U.S. troops from Vietnam in an honorable manner. Nixon and Kissinger found many opportunities in the Sino-Soviet split. They first attempted to force the two Communist giants to abandon North Vietnam. Then the Nixon administration sought an arms-control agreement with Moscow, while secretly approaching Beijing. Nixon sent the nuclear nonproliferation treaty to the Senate for approval and then agreed with Moscow on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and an Antibalistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, thereby accepting the concept of MAD. At the same time, his administration pushed for greater European unification, a fourpower treaty regarding the status of Berlin, and the reversion of Okinawa.²¹ At home, hoping to reduce antiwar demonstrations, Nixon promised to end the draft and establish an all-volunteer army.²²

Beginning in January 1969, the Nixon administration conducted a military posture review that produced National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 27. It adopted the so-called 1-1/2 strategy to handle one major war, and one minor, war at the same time. The United States would provide an initial defense of NATO and deal with a minor contingency in Europe or a joint defense of Korea or Southeast Asia with the support of Asian allies against non-Chinese attacks while it dealt with another lesser contingency. The Sino-Soviet split made a simultaneous attack unlikely, prompting a shift from a 2-1/2 to a 1-1/2 strategy. Furthermore, the prospect of a Sino-American rapprochement provided reason for a substantial reduction of U.S. forces in Asia.²³

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21. Richard C. Thornton, *The Nixon-Kissinger Years: The Reshaping of American Foreign Policy*, 2d ed. (St. Paul, Minn., 2001), xv-xxix, 3-4, 9.
 22. Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas S. Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*, 8th ed. (New York, 1997), 238.
 23. National Security Study Memorandum 3, 21 Jan. 1969, Subject: U.S. Military Posture and the Balance of Power, item number: PD01342, collection: Presidential Directives, DNSA at <<http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>>; NSDM 27, 11 Oct. 1969, Subject: U.S. Military Posture, PD01189.

The United States still needed to maintain forward-deployed forces in the Western Pacific to deter aggression and to fulfill its treaty commitments under the Nixon Doctrine. The administration was not prepared to make reductions in strategic weapons and the antibalistic missile program until the outcome of the SALT talks were known. No withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from NATO was anticipated. But in Asia, a large force reduction was expected: the withdrawal of one of three attack carriers; immediate removal of one division from Korea and of a second in fiscal year 1973; reduced tactical air deployments; and the closure of several bases in the Western Pacific. The Department of State was concerned that these changes might "scare the Asians to death."²⁴

The changed strategy, together with less revenue, inflation, increased military pay, and the decision for a volunteer army, combined to make defense budget cuts imperative. In addition, Congress became more assertive, using its appropriation powers to prevent widening of the war in Vietnam. The Nixon administration's \$71.8 billion defense budget request for fiscal year 1971 was the lowest in twenty years as a percentage of total federal spending. Although Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird described the military budget as "rock bottom" and "bare-boned" and warned against further cuts, Congress was determined to study it

closely. Legislators finally set the defense budget at \$66.6 billion, which Laird said would "increase the risks to our national security." Reduced funds demanded further cuts in manpower, bases, and ships. Laird was particularly distressed by the reduction in appropriation for Navy ships. The drop in naval vessels from 934 in January 1969 to 711 in November 1970 led one congressman to assert that America was becoming a "second-rate naval power."²⁵

Meanwhile, the Navy was conducting an analysis of U.S. requirements for naval forces, including overseas bases necessary to support them in accordance with National Security Study Memorandum 3 studies. The Navy recognized that it faced a real challenger for the first time since 1945. In 1950, the Soviet Navy was a "poor joke." By 1970, it had become "the second largest and most modern navy of the world" with new technologies such as anti-ship missiles, electronic warfare, and ocean surveillance. In addition, given increasing pressure against U.S. bases abroad, shrinking defense budget, increasing vulnerability of fixed land-based missiles, and British withdrawal from Asia east of the Suez, naval forces became more important in terms of flexibility, mobility, and cost effectiveness. The Navy requested a larger portion of the smaller defense budget, arguing that future strategy would depend to a greater extent on naval forces, especially in Asia, which faced both the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.²⁶

24. "U.S. Military Posture and the Balance of Power: General Purpose Forces Section [Attached to Cover Memorandum; Heavily Excised]," 5 Sept. 1969, item number: PR00302, collection: Presidential Directives Part II, and "NSSM 3: U.S. Military Posture and the Balance of Power," 10 Sept. 1969, PR00303, DNSA.

25. Cleveland to Green, 18 Aug. 1970, JU01311, DNSA; Ambrose and Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism*, 243-45. "Defense Budget Debate," *New York Times*, 9 Feb. 1970, 38; Robert M. Smith, "Wide Congressional Interest Stirred by Move to Study Defense Budget Closely and Offer Alternatives," *ibid.*, 2 Mar. 1970, 13; and Dana Adams Schmidt, "Laird Calls Cuts Peril to Security," *ibid.*, 17 Dec. 1970, 17.

26. National Security Study Memorandum 50, 26 Apr. 1969, PD01360; Report, "The Navy Problem of the '70s," by Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel Director Charles M. Herzfeld, 1 Jan. 1971, PR501; Chafee to Kissinger, 20 Jan. 1970, PR500, DNSA.

The Navy's study found that naval air forces, including carrier air wings, while expensive, had no Soviet counterpart. That warranted studying the effectiveness of carrier-based aircraft against ships. At the same time, however, the Navy was going to have to mothball up to six of its eighteen aircraft carriers. While the carrier task group had been king in the past, now the fleet of forty-one Polaris submarines consumed a large part of the Navy's budget. That suggested that budget cuts must come from conventional naval forces. Nonetheless, the notion of reducing the number of carriers in the fleet upset many senior admirals, who felt they were needed to keep the sea lanes open and fulfill American commitments in Asia.²⁷

To deal with these problems, the Navy proposed homeporting carriers overseas. That entailed moving the families of a ship's crew to the foreign port out of which it operated. Doing so would make it unnecessary for ships to return to the continental United States after every sixmonth deployment and would also reduce the time of family separations. This scheme envisioned a Navy with twelve carriers. But the United States needed to maintain five of them, at least three in the Western Pacific, and two in the Mediterranean, forward deployed. Each carrier required two backups, one undergoing overall and the other in preparation, if overseas deployments were not to exceed six months. Thus forward deploying five carriers required a force of fifteen of them. Presuming that the United States would not

reduce its overseas commitments, a twelve-carrier Navy could forward deploy five only by extending deployments, which would undermine morale and discourage reenlistment by prolonging family separation, or by basing some ships overseas. Rota, Malta, Naples, and Athens in the Mediterranean, and Sasebo and Singapore in the Western Pacific were proposed as possible overseas homeports.²⁸

The Navy's challenge was to maintain a strong overseas presence with a declining force while easing family separations which had adversely impacted personnel retention rates. By the end of fiscal year 1972, force levels were declining by an average of 41 percent. From 1964 to 1970, the first-term and reenlistment rates fell from 22.5 percent to 10 percent and from 41.5 percent to 27 percent, respectively. Excessive demands on personal lives and frequent, prolonged family separation were identified as a principal cause of low reenlistment rates. Without a "marked improvement" in the demands on personal lives, there was little hope of achieving an all-volunteer force. After studying four alternatives—continuing current deployment patterns, reducing commitments, multiple manning, and homeporting overseas—the Navy concluded that the last choice was the best. It would provide continued naval presence in support of national policy, increase flexibility, and improve personnel retention rates.²⁹

The Navy then selected Yokosuka in the Western Pacific, Athens in the Mediterranean,

27. "The Navy Problem of the '70s"; William Beecher, "Navy Considering Plan to Mothball 6 of 18 Carriers: Proposal Would Drop All 4 Antisubmarine Vessels and Reduce Fleet in Pacific," *New York Times*, 21 Oct. 1970, 1, 11.

28. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., *On Watch: A Memoir* (New York, 1976), 126-27.

29. Report, "A Study of Deployment Commitment Alternatives in Relation to Reduced Force Levels and Personnel Retention," 14 May 1971, Homeporting/CNO 1971-1973, Navy Filing Code 3110, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.

and Plymouth in eastern Atlantic as its preferred foreign homeports for carrier task groups.³⁰ Supply, ship/aircraft maintenance and repair, readiness, dependent support, and physical facilities determined those choices. In the Western Pacific, Sasebo, Subic Bay, Guam, and Singapore were considered but rejected as possible homeports. Sasebo lacked airfields and housing. Subic Bay was not suitable for navy wives and children. Guam would need harbor development and family housing construction. Singapore was politically infeasible. Yokosuka was chosen because it had sufficient fleet support (plentiful alongside berthing, ship repair facility, supply depot, and military airfield), dependent support (adequate housing, hospital and dental clinic, commissary/exchange, and American schools) and little opposition in the United States.³¹

Homeporting a Carrier Yokosuka

Before any carrier could be homeported at Yokosuka, Washington and Tokyo had to surmount a serious obstacle to the scheme: a prior decision to virtually shut down the base and transfer its control to Japan. That choice emerged from a confluence of pressures in Japan for reversion of American military facilities and desires for reduced defense spending in the United States.

In 1968, long before severe budget constraints hit the Navy, Admiral John McCain,

Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC) and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson collaborated on a study of the American base structure in Japan. This endeavor was prompted by continuing Japanese political pressures against the U.S. military presence and the American obligation, under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), to return facilities when they were no longer needed. It provided the basis for agreement on American release, transfer, or sharing of fifty-four installations in Japan—about half of those in the country.³²

When the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) met in May 1970, Defense Agency Director-General Nakasone Yasuhiro expressed appreciation for the Johnson-McCain initiative as likely to bring about "good results on military base problems." Nakasone continued that it would be desirable to transfer, "on base-by-base, case-by-case basis, " some of the U.S. military facilities, through consultation and coordination with the Japan Self Defense Forces. That would facilitate their "eventual utilization by U.S. forces when required."³³ Ambassador Armin H. Meyer welcomed this "gradualism" in base adjustment.³⁴ At the Japan-U.S. Security Subcommittee (SSC) in July 1970, the Americans voiced their desire for joint use of bases—for budgetary reasons. The Japanese responded positively and suggested that reentry into facilities that reverted to their control be handled on "case-by-case" basis.³⁵

30. Homeporting in Athens went well at first, but was frustrated by a political upheaval in Greece before a carrier was deployed. The reason why homeporting in Plymouth was not realized remains unknown.

31. Memo for the Chief Naval Operations, from Donald D. Engen, 2 Apr. 1971, Homeporting/CNO 1971-1973, Navy Filing code 3110, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.

32. PCH 1968, 1:69-70; 1970, 1:72; CINCPAC, Command History, 1967 1:70; PCH 1970, 1:72; all accessed via the Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project at <nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html>.

33. "Paper Presented by Minister Nakasone," enclosed with A-541, Tokyo to Department of State, 22 May 1970, JU01252, DNSA.

34. "Ambassador Meyer Statement: XI SCC, May 19, 1970," enclosed with Tokyo A-600 to Department of State, 11 June 1970, JU01267, DNSA.

35. Tokyo 5584 to Secretary of State, 22 July 1970, JU01304, DNSA.

In the meantime, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), responding to severe budgetary restrictions, tried to close bases and reduce forces in Japan. In December 1968, OSD sent CINCPAC eleven "tentative proposals" for such, and one of them proposed returning the naval base in Sasebo and reassigning ships to Yokosuka. CINCPAC objected that these proposals neglected "strategic and policy aspects," but OSD proceeded with plans to reduce U.S. presence in Japan.³⁶

In August 1970, Meyer expressed concern over service-by-service proposals for reduction of installations and facilities in Japan. He objected to swinging a "meat axe" the American base structure there. It would be wrong to close an "ideal base site" in Chitose; to downgrade "relatively problem-free" Misawa Air Base in Misawa to an air station and transfer its F-4 fighter aircraft to Korea. Moving similar planes from Yokota, near Tokyo, to Kadena on Okinawa and shutting down Atsugi Naval Air Station made no sense. It would even worse to virtually close down the "hitherto sacrosanct" naval base in Yokosuka. Meyer warned that such drastic changes would shock the Japanese government and give the impression of "U.S. disengagement" from Asia. He then proposed a coordinated approach to base and force reductions that would avoid the risk of adverse repercussions on Japan-U.S. security relations.³⁷

Subsequently, Meyer advised Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi of Washington's desire to coordinate long-term military facility needs

with the Japanese government. He explained that his government was going to consolidate its military facilities in Japan and make large cuts in its employment of Japanese nationals. The ambassador assured the foreign minister that the United States would continue to contribute air and naval forces to Japan's defense in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine. Aichi, while welcoming the "mutuality" concept, expressed concern that the United States might be disengaging from its Far East security responsibilities "too far and too fast."³⁸

In November, Meyer was authorized to begin discussions in Tokyo about the base consolidation plan. It included eliminating 9,000 Japanese employees and some 10,000 U.S. service personnel, as well as the virtual closure of the Yokosuka naval base. Its functions, including the headquarters of Commander, Seventh Fleet (COMSEVENTHFLT) would be transferred to Sasebo. Atsugi Naval Air Station, except for necessary access to aircraft repair facilities, would be returned to the Japanese. Itazuke Air Base would revert to Japanese control, and tactical air squadrons at Misawa and Yokota would go to Korea and Okinawa, respectively. The ambassador was instructed to seek reentry rights to some of the relinquished facilities and joint use rights at others.³⁹ The U.S. Navy wanted continued access to the Yokosuka Ship Repair Facility (SRF). This scheme presumed that concentration of tactical air force and Seventh Fleet units in the East China Sea/Korea area would provide continued assurance to allies while

36. PCH 1968, 1:71-79.

37. Tokyo 6119, Embassy Tokyo to Secretary of State, 11 Aug. 1970, JU1309, DNSA.

38. Tokyo 6766, Embassy Tokyo to Secretary of State, 1 Sept. 1970, JU01316, DNSA; A-938, Embassy Tokyo to Department of State, 11 Sept. 1970, JU1319, DNSA.

39. A-1144, Embassy Tokyo to Department of State, 1 Dec. 1970, JU01350, DNSA.

reducing costs. Its proposed changes were to take place by 30 June 1971. Although he was "a bit surprised" at the virtual closure of Yokosuka, Foreign Minister Aiichi agreed to study the American proposal.⁴⁰

Tokyo and Washington agreed on a base consolidation plan in December 1970. As a result of a series of bilateral negotiations, the U.S. Navy would retain control of Dry Dock No. 6 at Yokosuka, since the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) had inadequate capability to operate the SRF there.⁴¹ This arrangement would allow aircraft carriers to use the port and provide suitable mooring for SSNs.⁴² The State Department expressed great appreciation for this agreement as an "outstanding example" of communication and coordination.⁴³ But that evaluation soon turned out to be wrong.

At first, it seemed as if the announced plan would be implemented. In Yokosuka, more than 5,000 workers were notified of dismissal, and city officials launched a reemployment policy. Then in February 1971, a rumor to the effect that the Seventh Fleet would stay there began circulating. A month later, the rumor seemed likely to become true, for Yokosuka city officials were told that return of the SRF would be postponed until June 1972. That meant 4,300 workers would keep their jobs.⁴⁴ These changes were the product of serious second thoughts in Washington about

changes in the U.S. naval presence in Japan.

On 16 January 1971, Admiral Thomas Moorer, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, met Prime Minister Satō to discuss East Asian security issues. Satō said nothing was more important for Japan's security than the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Moorer replied it would continue to be an effective presence despite the proposed base consolidation. He also reiterated the importance of Japan's cooperation via base facilities and urged that the bases America was relinquishing should be preserved for military use.⁴⁵ Satō made an entry in his diary about the "retention" of the Seventh Fleet.⁴⁶

Three days later, Admiral Moorer called U. Alexis Johnson, now undersecretary of state for political affairs, and told him of his talks with Satō. The admiral said that a "somewhat easier budget situation" had permitted a review of the earlier decision on naval bases in Japan. Now it seemed best to keep Yokosuka basically as and to reduce operations at Sasebo. Johnson replied that he had been surprised by the Navy's decision to give up Yokosuka, one of the "least troublesome facilities." However, the SCC announcement had created a new situation, and he had no idea of what problems "walking the cat back" might bring about. When asked for his opinion, Ambassador Meyer replied that doing so would be "troublesome" but probably "manageable." The Satō-Moorer talk provided a "peg."⁴⁷

40. Eliot to Kissinger, 23 Nov. 1970, DEF 15 JAPAN-US, SNF 1970-73, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, NA.

41. A-1143, Embassy Tokyo to Department of State, 2 Dec. 1970, *ibid.*

42. Tokyo 9994 to Secretary of Defense, 5 Dec. 1970, *ibid.*

43. State 207979 to Embassy Tokyo, 21 Dec. 1970, *ibid.*

44. Nagao, 118ñ20.

45. Tokyo 453, 18 Jan. 1971, JU01356, DNSA.

46. Satō Eisaku, Satō Eisaku Nikki (Diary of Satō Eisaku) (Tokyo, 1997), 4:252.

47. State 9045, Johnson to Meyer, 19 Jan. 1971, DEF 15 JAPAN-US, SNF 1970- 73, CFPF, RG 59, NA; Tokyo 543, Meyer to Johnson, 21 Jan. 1971, JU01357, DNSA.

Coincidentally, Embassy Tokyo received a separate "blockbuster" message from Washington. The Navy was considering homeporting a six-ship destroyer squadron with 1,920 officers and men and 1,530 dependents at Sasebo. The Kyushu site was chosen because it had extensive support facilities and had previously been a homeport for American ships. The deployment of an aircraft carrier with 7,097 officers and men and 5,675 dependents to Sasebo was also being studied. These changes were allegedly part of a worldwide homeporting plan. The State Department asked for Embassy Tokyo's assessment of possible Japanese reactions to this scheme. The embassy replied that homeporting a destroyer squadron would be "manageable," but that of an aircraft carrier was "not feasible." First of all, housing was scarce in Sasebo. Second, there was no adequate airfield for a carrier air wing; since Itazuke was being returned for civilian use and Iwakuni was crammed full with a Marine air wing. Third, the nuclear weapons that a carrier might have aboard would pose a "very substantial political issue" in Japan. Finally, this change in plans was inconsistent with what the SCC had agreed upon and announced. The embassy added that due to its extensiveness and distance from civilian areas, it might be "possible" to homeport a carrier at Yokosuka.⁴⁸

Neither Admiral Moorer nor Undersecretary Johnson knew about this "blockbuster" telegram. It also turned out that Chief of

Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt preferred homeporting at Yokosuka rather than Sasebo. That prompted Johnson to remark, cynically, that the "right hand in [the] Navy [was] not fully aware of what left hand was doing."⁴⁹ Various members of the Japanese government, including Admiral Uchida Kazutomi, chief of the maritime staff, and Funada Naka, speaker of the House, also told Admiral Moorer that they preferred the U.S. Navy to stay at Yokosuka since the JMSDF was not in a position to take over its various elements.⁵⁰

In late January 1971, the Navy sent an investigative group led by Vice Admiral Francis Joseph Blouin to discuss the homeporting issue with the embassy. Those conversations confirmed the operational value of putting major naval dispositions at Yokosuka and Atsugi rather than Sasebo. Housing would not pose serious problems, but carrier homeporting might present difficulties over the introduction of nuclear weapons under prior consultation arrangements—a situation both Tokyo and Washington wanted to avoid. The conferees concluded that the key to modifying the base consolidation plan was "affirmative action" by the Japanese government.⁵¹

That prompted the embassy to sound out the Foreign Ministry about keeping the American naval presence at Yokosuka. The Japanese response was "favorable" but expressed concern about public reaction. Tokyo expressed interest in the U.S. Navy operating the ship repair facility at Yokosuka until 30 June

48. Tokyo 605, Meyer to Johnson, 21 Jan. 1971, no subject, JU01358, DNSA; State 9367 to Tokyo, 18 Jan. 1971, Joint State-Defense Message; Tokyo 625 to Secretary of State, 22 Jan. 1971, DEF 15 JAPAN-US, SNF 1970-73, CFPE, RG 59, NA.

49. State 12338, Johnson to Meyer, 23 Jan. 1971, DEF 15 JAPAN-US, SNF 1970-73, CFPE, RG 59, NA.

50. Point Paper, Balch, 26 Jan. 1971, subject: Homeporting of Naval Forces Overseas, Homeporting/CNO 1971-1973, Navy Filing Code 3110, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act; Agawa, Umi no Yūjō, 165.

51. Tokyo 925 to Secretary of State, 1 Feb. 1971, DEF 15 JAPAN-US, SNF 1970-73, CFPE, RG 59, NA.

1972. But Japanese officials did not expect the JMSDF to take over all of its facilities thereafter. On 5 March, Aichi and Nakasone agreed to work out a public statement on the extended U.S. presence in Yokosuka.⁵²

That announcement came at the end of March 1971. The U.S. Navy would continue to operate the ship repair facility at Yokosuka until 30 June 1972 and, "as a result of this change," had called off the transfer of the Seventh Fleet flagship to Sasebo. The Americans would continue to use Yokosuka as a "principal operating port," and some 4,300 Japanese workers, who had been scheduled to be laid off by June 1971, would be retained. In the wake of positive statements made by Director-General Nakasone and Foreign Minister Aichi and favorable media coverage, the embassy did not think political problems from this revision of the base realignment plan would arise. But the change threw officials in Sasebo and Yokosuka into confusion, and Nagano Masayoshi, mayor of the latter city, decided to claim back as many American-requisitioned areas as possible.⁵³

Although the March 1971 statement made no reference to such, the Navy proceeded with a phased approach to homeporting a six-ship destroyer squadron (Phase I) and an aircraft carrier (Phase II). The secretary of defense approved Phase I in May 1971 and an authorized negotiations with the Japanese govern-

ment for the homeporting of six destroyers.⁵⁴ Meyer advised warning Tokyo of Washington's desire to homeport an aircraft carrier, and he recommended using the phrase "forward basing" rather than "home porting."⁵⁵

In July 1971, Defense Secretary Laird visited Tokyo and informally discussed the possibility of basing a carrier task group in Japan as a way for the Japanese to support the nuclear deterrence and the American naval presence.⁵⁶ He also urged Japan to share the cost of deterrence by accepting the presence of more nuclear-powered vessels such as the *Enterprise*. The Japanese government asked Washington to delay the *Enterprise* issue until after a special October Diet session which was expected to discuss the Okinawa reversion.⁵⁷ During this session, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution on applying the three non-nuclear principles to the Okinawa reversion agreement which had been signed the preceding June, and called for its ratification by the Diet.⁵⁸

Despite the sudden announcement in July 1971 of President Nixon's plan to visit Beijing, negotiations on homeporting a destroyer squadron proceeded smoothly, and the Japanese government approved it a month later. But basing the ships at Yokosuka would require American retention of Drydocks 4, 5, and 6. The JMSDF could operate only Drydocks 1, 2, and 3, and Drydocks 4 and 5 were still sched-

52. Tokyo 1936 and 1983 to Secretary of State, 4 and 5 Mar. 1971, *ibid.*

53. Tokyo 2934 to Secretary of State, 1 Apr. 1971, Subject: Revision of USN Base Realignment, *ibid.*; Tsuji, Chinmoku no Minato, 281; and Nagao, 122.

54. State 95359 to Embassy Tokyo, 29 May 1971, Joint State/Defense Message, DEF 15 JAPAN-US, SNF 1970-73, CFPE, RG 59, NA.

55. Memo, 00389P60, Thorpe, 16 June 1971, Homeporting/CNO 1971-1973, Navy Filing System Code of 3110, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.

56. Selig S. Harrison, "Laird to Japan: Skip A-Arms," *New York Times*, 11 July 1971, 2; William Beecher, "Japan Cool to U.S. on Carrier Shifts," *ibid.*, 16 Dec. 1971, 9.

57. Selig S. Harrison, "Sato's Survival Hangs in Balance," *Washington Post*, 24 Sept. 1971, A27.

58. Tanaka Akihiko, *Anzen Hoshō: Sengo Gojūnen no Mosaku (Security: Fifty years of search after the war)* (Tokyo, 1997), 224-25.

uled for release to Japan by 30 June 1972. The Navy did not favor commercial operation of Drydocks 4 and 5 because it feared that would result in a loss of flexibility. Washington argued that retention of sufficient facilities at Yokosuka was "of paramount importance to U.S. strategic needs." In March 1972, the Japanese government accepted continued American control of Drydocks 4 and 5.⁵⁹

Homeporting also depended on continued use of aviation facilities at Atsugi. The Japanese government regarded SOFA Article II Section 4 (b) (II-4-b) as the appropriate joint-use arrangement for them, while the Navy wanted to retain them under Article II-4-a.⁶⁰ The December 1970 announcement stated that only Fleet Air Western Pacific Repair Activity (FAWPRA) would remain at Atsugi, but the Navy now preferred to keep Commander Fleet Air, Western Pacific (COMFAIRWESTPAC) and a detachment of VQ-1, including four TFY aircraft there as well.⁶¹ But joint use of Atsugi Naval Air Station by the U.S. Navy and the JMSDF under Article II-4-b went into effective from July 1971.

During the negotiations on base realignment, the Americans realized that Japanese politicians were reluctant to agree to their various requests. The possibility of a reduction in Sino-U.S. tensions as a result of the

forthcoming Nixon trip to China made it very difficult for the Satō administration to justify the U.S. presence in Japan.⁶² Japanese leaders were unwilling to publicly support U.S. requirements or relocation proposals for fear of toppling Prime Minister Satō and/or destroying their chances of succeeding him. For example, Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo, a possible next prime minister, was reportedly hesitant to agree to Ship Repair Facility retention and the housing of a carrier crew's families in Yokosuka. Accordingly, Embassy Tokyo recommended postponing any negotiations on "extended deployment" of a carrier until an expected change of government took place in the early summer of 1972. The Navy, however, preferred a firmer stand so as to prevent any disturbance of its operational capabilities.⁶³

Thus some conflict between the State and Defense Departments ensued. In May 1972, the Pentagon asked for diplomatic help in achieving its Phase II deployment, planned for March 1973. That scheme now projected sending an aircraft carrier, its 4,500-man crew, and some 800 families to Yokosuka. Its air wing would need to use Atsugi periodically. In addition, the Navy wanted to homeport two combat stores ships (AFS) with 800 military personnel and their 270 families at Sasebo. Defense Secretary Laird thought it necessary to

59. PCH, 1972, 66-67; Tokyo 3282 to Secretary of State, 30 Mar. 1972, DEF 15 JAPAN-US, SNF 1970ñ73, CFPF, RG 59, NA.

60. SOFA II-4-a: "When facilities and areas are temporarily not being used by the United States armed forces, the Government of Japan may make, or permit Japanese nationals to make, interim use of such facilities and areas provided that it is agreed between the two Governments through the Joint Committee that such use would not be harmful to the purposes for which the facilities and areas are normally used by the United States armed forces." SOFA II-4-b: "With respect to facilities and areas which are to be used by States armed forces for limited periods of time, the Joint Committee shall specify in the agreements covering such facilities and areas the extent to which the provisions of this Agreement shall apply."

61. State 51968 to Tokyo, 26 Mar. 1971, Joint State/Defense Message, DEF 15 JAPAN-US, SNF 1970-73, CFPF, RG 59, NA.

62. Harrison, "Sato's Survival Hangs in Balance."

63. CINCPAC to Secretary of State, 19 Mar. 1972, Exclusive for Green from McCain, JU01516, DNSA; Tokyo 2608 to CINCPAC, 14 Mar. 1972, DEF 15 JAPAN-US, SNF 1970ñ73, CFPF, RG 59, NA.

go directly to Prime Minister Satō to get Japanese government approval for this plan.⁶⁴

The State Department responded to this request cautiously because prior consultation would be required for deployment of the carrier and for the introduction of nuclear weapons. That might jeopardize other valuable defense rights in Japan. Homeporting a carrier would raise substantial "legal and political problems" at a time when the political position of security-minded friends in Japan was weak. Prior consultation should be avoided. But because of the ongoing public debate about it raised by the return of Okinawa and the transfer of some aircraft units to from Japan to Vietnam, the Japanese government might be compelled to ask for such consultation. The diplomats then asked about a possible homeporting arrangement elsewhere in East Asia and about basing a carrier without nuclear weapons aboard in Japan.⁶⁵

The Pentagon regarded the diplomats' response as "too pessimistic" and blind to the "many positive factors involved" in homeporting a carrier in Japan. Prior consultation should be avoided, but putting one there would not constitute a "major change" in deployment so as to raise the issue of prior consultation. Homeporting was simply a "matter of notification." Japan, the Pentagon argued, needed the American nuclear umbrella and must realize that the United States had to provide appropriate forces to maintain the umbrella and must accept the provision of appropriate forces to

maintain it.⁶⁶

Dispatching a carrier without nuclear weapons aboard was "neither militarily practical nor legally necessary." Doing so would weaken the seaborne nuclear deterrence by creating difficult operational problems and setting a precedent for acquiescence in pressures from other host nations. The Pentagon held that the record of the Reischauer-Ōhira talk of 1963 confirmed that the prior consultation clause did not apply in the case of nuclear weapons on board vessels in Japanese waters or ports. The Defense Department thus expected the diplomats to begin discussions with the Japanese government soon, but the latter were still cautious.⁶⁷

In the meantime, Prime Minister Satō bowed out in triumph after the successful reversion of Okinawa. Tanaka Kakuei succeeded him on 7 July 1972 and brought back Ōhira Masayoshi as foreign minister. Tanaka's prime foreign policy objective was to normalize Japan-China relations. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was expected to be a difficult issue in Sino-Japanese talks, but shortly after he became prime minister, Tanaka received a secret message from Beijing assuring him that the treaty would not hinder normalization. Before visiting China, Tanaka met President Nixon in Honolulu in August 1972. He pledged that Tokyo would "faithfully and fully" implement the security treaty, in effect guaranteeing continued flexible use of American bases in Japan.⁶⁸

During the Tanaka-Nixon meeting in

64. Laird to Rogers, 9 May 1972, JU01536, DNSA.

65. Action Memo 7208235, Hummel and Pickering to the Acting Secretary, 23 May 1972, JU1540; Acting Secretary Johnson to Laird, 26 May 1972, JU01541, DNSA.

66. Laird to Rogers, 17 June 1972, JU01562; PM/ISO Day to Spiers, 29 June 1972, JU01563, DNSA.

67. Ibid.

68. "The World and Japan," Database, "Record of a Conversation Between Zhou Enlai and Yoshikatsu Takeiri, July 29, 1971," <www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPCH/19720721.01.O1J.html> (acc. 31 July 2004); Ogata Sadako, *Normalization with China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Processes* (Berkeley, Calif., 1988), 50-51.

Hawaii, Undersecretary U. Alexis Johnson notified Foreign Minister Ōhira of the plan to homeport a carrier in Yokosuka. He said Washington expected to use only one carrier, instead of two or three, to maintain a presence in the Western Pacific. But an additional 800 families would come to Yokosuka. Johnson reminded Ōhira of his 1963 conversation with Reischauer and stated that the planned deployment would not require prior consultation. Ōhira replied that he, personally, would make a very serious study of this subject.⁶⁹

Johnson later wrote that he decided to take up the homeporting issue with Ōhira himself because State Department Japan experts feared "another *Enterprise*-style explosion of demonstrations."⁷⁰ They thought carrier homeporting was "difficult" due to the nuclear issue. The Japanese public was sensitive to B-52 operations out of Japan, and had blocked the movement of American tanks from a depot to the Yokohama docks for shipment to Vietnam. Pressure for base reduction and restrictions on their use was growing. Reduced tensions in Asia resulting from Nixon's trip to China, the winding down of the Vietnam War, and the dialogue between the two Koreas greatly diminished the security threat. Thus, these experts even suggested, revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty to allow only for the "emergency stationing of U.S. forces in Japan" might be in order. In their view, the Pentagon tended to be more "arbitrary than necessary" and paid little heed to Japanese reactions.⁷¹ Johnson and the State Department experts thus

continued to be pessimistic about homeporting a carrier in Yokosuka.

Their fears, however, turned out to be exaggerated. By the end of December 1972, Tokyo had agreed to Washington's request to homeport a carrier task group at Yokosuka.

Precisely how the Japanese government did so remains only partially clear. According to James Auer, Political Advisor to Rear Admiral Julian T. Burke, Commander, Naval Forces, Japan (CNFJ) at that time, House Speaker Funada Naka was persuaded to lend his assistance. He "educated" Prime Minister Tanaka on the strategic importance of carrier homeporting. Tanaka then had Funada convey a personal message to Ambassador Robert S. Ingersoll to the effect that his government would accept a carrier in Yokosuka without prior consultation.⁷² Although there is no documentary evidence to support this account, Funada's initiative may have had some positive effect on the outcome of negotiations that followed.

They began in September 1972, following Washington's formal request for "extended deployment" of an aircraft carrier in Japan. Negotiators agreed on the release of water surface rights at Oppama, adjacent to the Yokosuka naval base; reduced American usage of the Nagasaka rifle range; and joint use, in accordance with SOFA II-4-a, of Drydocks 4 and 5. By mid-November, Embassy Tokyo reported that all homeporting issues for a carrier at Yokosuka had been "satisfactorily" resolved, even though aircraft noise problems

69. Memo of Conversation, Ōhira, Johnson (Johnson), and others, 31 Aug. 1972, JU01629, DNSA.

70. U. Alexis Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1984), 558.

71. Briefing Paper, "Carrier Home porting: Japan," August 1972, JU1581; Report, "U.S. Military Presence in Japan," August 1972, JU1596, DNSA.

72. Auer oral history interview with Murata Kōji.

at Atsugi, then considered "minor," remained." Later that month, the two governments exchanged formal letters of agreement. In December, the Navy announced its "Overseas Family Residence Program" which would homeport a carrier in Japan.⁷³ On 5 October 1973, thousands protested as the USS Midway arrived in Yokosuka. The Strategic Significance of Homeporting a Carrier at Yokosuka

The permanent basing of a carrier in Japan and the policy review which led to it early in the 1970s pointed the way toward the Navy's 1986 Maritime Strategy. Its essence was deterrence, and, in the event of its failure, forward defense and allied cooperation to terminate a war on favorable terms. The aircraft carrier was central to all of this. In peacetime, the U.S. Navy would support friends and allies in various ways, such as ship visits to foreign ports and joint exercises with them. That would remind the world that America was willing and able to defend itself and its allies. In wartime, success in anti-air, antisubmarine, and anti-surface warfare was considered "crucial" to effective prosecution of offensive operations. Naval forces are flexible, and that characteristic makes them especially useful for crisis control. But in this scheme, they were seen as essential for changing the nuclear balance in America's favor. They would destroy Soviet ballistic missile submarines and improve the overall U.S. strategic position by surrounding the Soviet Union. Carrier battle groups, augmented by submarines or surface ships equipped with Tomahawk missiles were "central" to defeating

Soviet air, submarine, surface- and sea-based nuclear forces.⁷⁴

The three pillars of deterrence credibility are: capability, intention, and positive estimates of them from adversaries. During the Cold War, the Soviets, or any other potential aggressors, would have not been deterred by empty threats and rhetoric. For a credible extended deterrence over Japan, the United States needed an appropriate deterrent plus a commitment to protect Japan if necessary. It was essential that the Soviet Union not degrade American capability and intent.⁷⁵ Credible extended deterrence required a forward posture to demonstrate alliance solidarity, which in turn strengthened the credibility of the American deterrent.

The nuclear umbrella constituted a large part of U.S. extended deterrence over Japan. It is no exaggeration to say that maintaining the credibility of the nuclear umbrella was what the management of the Japan-U.S. alliance was all about during the Cold War. In its early stages, some Japanese feared entrapment in a U.S.-led war. In the 1960s, however, the Japanese were forced to come to grips with the problem of nuclear defense due to the Okinawa reversion, the anti-ballistic missile (ABM), the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and the Chinese nuclear threat. On the strategic level, U.S.-Soviet arms limitation talks made the United States feel less endangered by the Soviet Union, and it was thought decades would pass before Chinese missiles could reach American soil. These developments prompted some Japanese who had feared

73. Tokyo 11700 to Secretary of State, 11 Nov. 1972; Tokyo 11374 to Secretary of State, 25 Oct. 1972; Tokyo 12667 to Secretary of State, 12 Dec. 1972, DEF 15 JAPAN-US, SNF 1970-73, CFPF, RG 59, NA.

74. James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 112 (January 1986), 8, 12, 14.

75. Ogawa Shinichi, "Theoretical Examination of Extended Nuclear Deterrence," *International Relations* 90 (Japan Association of International Relations, March 1989), 94-95.

entrapment in an American war to worry that Washington might abandon Japan. Tokyo might have decided to "go nuclear," but instead the Satō government chose to proclaim the three non-nuclear principles and rely on American protection under the nuclear umbrella. In that situation, Japan as a beneficiary of American nuclear strength needed to pay a price for Yankee protection.⁷⁶

By accepting American nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable vessels into its ports and waters, Japan paid that price. Nuclear-powered submarine visits to Japan not only enhanced their forward operations but also demonstrated firm alliance solidarity. Homeporting the USS *Midway* was a greater price because of its strategic significance. The system of prior consultation, with help from the 1960 assurance, became an effective tool making it possible for the Japanese government to publicly deny the presence of nuclear weapons in its ports and waters while privately and silently assenting to that presence. Many Americans, including Rear Admiral Gene R. LaRocque in 1974 and Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer in 1981, testified that U.S. warships entered Japanese waters and ports with nuclear weapons aboard. Opinion polls showed that 70-80 percent of Japanese citizens believed that those ships did so with nuclear weapons on board. More importantly, the Soviet leaders believed so, too. Thus, homeporting the USS *Midway* in Japan significantly increased the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence.

Many Japanese continued to oppose the

presence of an American aircraft carrier in their ports. In 1975, the city of Kobe introduced the so-called "Kobe formula." Under it, the city, which has administrative control over its port, requires foreign military vessels seeking entry to certify that they do not carry nuclear weapons. If they do not certify, the city will deny the use of its port. The formula is meant to implement the three nonnuclear principles at a municipal level. Although it is nothing more than a resolution passed by the Kobe city council, the formula has kept American warships offshore because Washington refuses to confirm or to deny the presence of nuclear weapons on its ships and/or aircraft.⁷⁷ But Kobe's actions do not reflect the views of the Japanese public as a whole. Ordinary citizens might be dissatisfied with their government's inconsistent policy, but they understand the need to accept important seaborne elements of the U.S. nuclear deterrence in their ports and waters.⁷⁸

The 1978 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines confirmed the integration of a carrier battle group based at Yokosuka into Japan's national security system. For the first time, they clearly stated that the United States would "maintain a nuclear deterrent capability and the forward deployments of combat-ready forces and other forces capable of reinforcing them." The Guidelines also promised that, in the event of an armed attack against Japan, U.S. Naval Forces would support Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force operations by "the use of task forces providing additional mobility and strike power."

U.S. forward deployment in the Western

76. Intelligence Note, 64, Hughes to Rusk, 24 Jan. 1968, JU878, DNSA; Selig S. Harrison, "Laird Confused Japan on A-Arms Issue," Washington Post, 14 July 1971, A1, A14.

77. Oikawa Yoshiatsu, Hikaku Kobe Hoshiki (The non-nuclear Kobe formula), Human Booklet 18 (Kobe, 1992).

78. Komori Yoshihisa, *Kaku wa Mochikomareta* (We nuclear weapons introduced?)(Tokyo, 1981).

Pacific, symbolized by the presence of the USS *Midway* in Japan, enhanced global deterrence by providing a clear indication that, in the event of war, the Soviet Union would have to fight there as well as in Europe. Soviet war-fighting doctrine gave high priority to locating and destroying Western sea-based nuclear assets.⁷⁹ Japan accepted the presence of those U.S. nuclear assets, including carriers, SSNs, and other vessels armed with Tomahawk missiles but excluding SSBNs, in its ports and waters in the 1960s and 1970s. And in the 1980s, the Japanese further contributed to their own defense by increasing anti-air and anti-submarine capabilities in the name of "sea lane defense."⁸⁰

Conclusion

Presence leads to credibility. In East Asia, the sea-based deterrent has been the most important component of the American military posture. Sea-based deterrence depends on the unrestricted access to necessary facilities in foreign countries, which in turn requires the cooperation of friendly governments. Tokyo, despite the difficulties described in this essay, provided that cooperation by accepting the homeporting of the USS *Midway* at Yokosuka thirty-five years ago. That act laid the foundations for an American nuclear naval presence that continues to this day. On 25 September 2008, the USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) came to Yokosuka as the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to be homeported there. It had no nuclear weapons aboard, for Washington had announced in 1992 that its ships and air-

craft would no longer carry them in peacetime. Nonetheless, Japanese opponents, who had objected to the arrival of a "mobile nuclear power plant," protested. The U.S. Navy had softened the effect of their objections, however, by providing a fact sheet on the safety of the ship's reactors that referred back to the aide-memoires of the 1960s. It had also invited Yokosuka's mayor and business leaders to San Diego to reaffirm the safety of nuclear-powered naval vessels in civilian ports. Those gestures, which built upon experience drawn from the homeporting of the USS *Midway*, demonstrated anew the importance of cooperation between Washington and Tokyo in the maintenance of security in the Western Pacific.⁸¹

What does the continued presence of an American aircraft carrier in Japan portend? Today, American power in the international arena has been weakened by the Iraq War. A rising China is building up its navy which includes submarine forces meant for sea denial just as those of the Soviet Union were in the Cold War. North Korea has virtually become a nuclear power, and its missiles can reach Japan if not the United States. Once again there is growing concern about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. After Pyongyang's 2006 nuclear test, some Japanese fear that Washington might place more emphasis on non-proliferation than on de-nuclearization when dealing with North Korea. Some in Japan have even called for revision of the three non-nuclear principles so that their country might develop its own nuclear weapons.

79. Watkins, "Maritime Strategy," 7.

80. For the details of U.S.-Japan cooperation in the western Pacific, see Tetsuo Kotani, "Sea-Lane Defense: The Dynamics of U.S.-Japan Naval Cooperation during the Cold War," *Dōshisha Law Review*, August 2006.

81. Stars and Stripes (Pacific ed.), 27 Sept. 2008, <www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=57665> (acc. 27 Sept. 2008).

The deployment of the USS *George Washington*, however, indicates that America's commitment to the defense of Japan and its other friends and allies in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean remains firm. The Pentagon's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasized the reinforcement of American carrier and submarine forces in the Pacific so as to maintain the offensive capability essential to extended deterrence. Washington and Tokyo have agreed that the carrier air wing currently based at heavily populated Atsugi should be transferred to less populous Iwakuni so as to reduce irritating noise pollution. In October 2007, the U.S. Navy unveiled its newest maritime strategy which gives equal weight to

preserving peace and winning a war. The strategy calls for international cooperation, recognizing that no nation alone can assure the security of the seas where various threats lurk. To that end, it calls for the expansion of American naval capabilities to assure forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and enhanced disaster response and humanitarian assistance capabilities.⁸²

The carrier strike group homeported at Yokosuka will continue to be important for the maintenance of those capabilities and the preservation of security cooperation between Japan and the United States.

82. "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," <www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf> (acc. 30 Nov. 2007).