

OPRF MARINT Monthly Report

May 2010



CONTENTS

Intelligence Summary in May 2010

1. Information Digest

- 1.1 Maritime Security
- 1.2 Military Development
- 1.3 Maritime Boundaries
- 1.4 Diplomacy and International Relations
- 1.5 Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors
- 1.6 Ocean Resources, Energy, Sea Environment and Others

2. Intelligence Assessment

A Commentary on the Article: “The Geography of Chinese Power” by Robert D. Kaplan

This monthly report was summarized and produced by OPRF staff writers based on their analyses and assessments of open source information.

Each source of information is described as an internet link in a bracket, which is available as URL online as of the end of May 2010.

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Intelligence Summary in May 2010

Maritime Security: Following April, in May the warships dispatched by respective nations, including those of the EUNAFOR, NATO Fleet, and CTF-151 joint anti-piracy forces among others, continues deployments to the counter-piracy activities. The warships of the respective nations belonging to these flotillas were sent to the scenes of the attacks upon receipt of information, and captured groups of pirates which usually operate, employing a mother boat and two small boats (skiffs). These warships took a policy of the countermeasures of investigating the pirate suspects, confiscating their weapons and equipment, destroying a mother boat and a small boat, and eventually releasing them after embarking them in the remaining small boat, or detaining the pirate suspects. In other ways, when the maritime patrol aircraft and ship-borne helicopters sighted the pirate groups operating in pairs with a mother boat and two skiffs, these units occasionally informed the warships operating in the vicinity, and in some cases the boarding team which was sent from the naval vessel would take the similar countermeasures. For example, on April 4 a helicopter from the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyer *Ohnami*, taking part in the escort mission, sighted a suspicious skiff with seven persons on board just outside the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden. Upon receipt of information, the Greek naval frigate HS *Ellis* stopped the skiff, but its boarding team released the boat after the investigation.

On the other hand, following the release of the German-registered container ship by the Dutch navy by force on 5 April, there was a release of the tanker by the Russian navy. On the morning May 6, after about 24 hours of hijacking of the tanker, the Russian antisubmarine destroyer stormed the tanker. Liberating the vessel, the warship detained ten pirate suspects. When the crew was attacked by pirates, they had been locked themselves in the safety quarters, the Russian navy could suppress the pirates only in ten minutes. Although there were no casualties to the crew, one pirate was killed. Later, on the 7th, the Russian navy released ten pirate suspects they had detained, embarking them in a skiff, but they did not reach the Somali coast. According to an announcement by a Russian official of the Defense Ministry (DM) on the 11th, ten pirate suspects released on the 7th were disarmed and embarked in the rubber boat without navigational equipment. They were released, drifting 350 miles off the coast of the Somali coast. According to the DM, the boat disappeared on the radar scope in about an hour, and appeared to be dead. The DM says, so long as there was no international law to punish the pirates, there was no option but leaving them drift in the scene. However, this option was also debated in Russia. The incident caused to emphasize the necessity of maintaining the facilities of confining the persons who are found guilty after being indicted for piracy by the nations in the regions and the related countries.

Regarding the facilities of punishing the pirates, there were new moves. On the 20th, Tanzania said it would prosecute Somali pirates in response to a European Union call for other nations in the region to share the financial and security burden on Kenya and Seychelles.

Parliament has already approved amendments to the penal code to ensure that Somali pirates can now be prosecuted in Tanzania. On the 25th, first European trial of Somali pirate suspects begun at a court in the Netherlands. The five Somalis were charged with trying to hijack the general cargo ship MV *Samanyolu* under the flag of the Netherlands Antilles in the Gulf of Aden on January 2, 2009. They face up 12 years in jail if found guilty.

Military Developments: Over the next five to seven years, India will be manufacturing 37 major warships at homes. India's warship-building capability has been improving in recent years. On April 29, the Indian navy commissioned its first indigenously manufactured stealth frigate, and saw the country join a group of eight nations that had built warships with naval stealth technology. Prior to this event, in July 2009, it launched its first indigenously built nuclear submarine for sea trials, becoming just the sixth country in the world to build such a vessel. An Indian journalist mentions in his article on Asia Times Online dated the 12th that it is the feature that several of the warships India is building are high-tech and low-cost.

Viking Air of Victoria in Canada has finalized with the Vietnamese navy a purchase agreement for six amphibious DHC-6 Twin Otter Series 400 aircraft. The deal would give Vietnam navy its first fixed wing naval air force, and of six, some are designed specifically for maritime patrol.

The PLA Daily dated the 17th carried an article of the demagnetization operations (OPS) for a missile destroyer of the South Sea Fleet (SSF) with photographs of the scenes.

On the 20th, the South Korean joint civilian-military investigation team that had been investigating the sinking of the South Korean navy's patrol ship "*Cheonan*" officially announced that they reached a conclusion that the ship "was sunk by the attack of a torpedo made by North Korea." Yoon Duk-yong, co-head of the investigation team said at an interview, "*Cheonan*' was cut by a shock wave and bubble jet effect caused by an underwater explosion by a torpedo and sunk. Weapon system was confirmed to be a high-explosive torpedo with a net explosive weight of about 250 kilograms, manufactured by North Korea."

Maritime Boundaries: On the 6th, a Vietnamese foreign ministry spokesperson said China 's ban on fishing in waters in the South China Sea (called the East Sea in Vietnam), including the areas under Vietnam 's sovereignty, is "totally worthless." (The ban will take effect from May 16-August 1.) Additionally, on the 25th, Vietnamese naval commander Nguyen Van Hien asked fishermen to sail out to sea as usual despite China's ban on fishing in the East Sea. Naval commander said, "The specific means to make sure our fishermen are safe sailing out is that the navy is patrolling closely the waters that fall under Vietnam's economic privileges." Hien said Vietnam will intensify patrolling from now on.

On the 26th, a plenary session of the upper house passed unanimously the legislation that the state instead of local authorities shall improve the port facilities in the specific, isolated island which becomes a foothold of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in Japan's southernmost and easternmost ends and others. The new law is slated to take effect within three months after

promulgation.

Diplomacy and International Relations: On the 19th, Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of general staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), made an address at the meeting of China-ASEAN (10+1) Regional Forum (ARF) which was held in Da Nang, Vietnam. Ma Xiaotian pointed out that, as non-traditional security threats are sticking out in succession, all the countries in the region should join hands to deal with such threats, and proposed to deepen a system framework of mechanisms of the non-traditional regional security cooperation.

Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors: According to the Lloyd's List dated on the 5th, the very large crude oil carriers (VLCCs) carrying crude oil bound from the Middle East to Europe and the United States sail at least 1,000 nautical miles east off Mombasa, Kenya, to avoid piracy, and an expert in London says the distance continues to be getting longer. The additional cost for transporting oil by drastic roundabout routes is estimated to be 15.6 million US dollars a year at the present price, arousing debates over the shipping contracts.

On the 7th, the Indonesian port authority announced its plans to build a new large-scale container port outside Jakarta / Tanjung Priok. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is presently carrying out a feasibility study for the project. Once fully completed, the new port would be able to accommodate large mainline container vessels and provide an annual handling capacity of 10 Million teu.

On the 14th, Essar Projects (India) Ltd. signed a contract with the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India to execute Port and Inland Water Transport components of the "Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project" to be executed in Myanmar. The contract involves the construction of two jetties at Sittwe and Paletwa in Myanmar, dredging and construction of cargo barges etc. to facilitate cargo movement along the river Kaladan. This project is being executed by the Government of India to ease the movement of goods from mainland India to the North-Eastern states of India. It is to be executed within 36 months.

Ocean Resources, Energy, Sea Environment and Others: On the morning of the 25th, an oil tanker and a bulk carrier collided in the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) of the Singapore Strait. The collision caused a 10-meter gash on the left side of the tanker. The tanker was carrying about 62,000 tons of light crude oil, spilling an estimated 2,500 tons of oil.

Intelligence Assessment: Robert D. Kaplan, a journalist of the U. S. magazine, *The Atlantic*, and a senior fellow of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), published an interesting article entitled "The Geography of Chinese Power" in the U.S. magazine, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June. In the article, Kaplan discusses the background of the Chinese advance into the oceans from geo-political points of view. He says that, at present, "a Greater China" is being formed in "the Eastern Hemisphere," in which the PLAN is a driving force. On the other hand, an expansion of the Chinese influence will be in touch with the Indian and Russian borders, and, above all, with

operational areas of the United States Navy in an unstable form. From now on, in order to keep the balance of power in the eastern hemisphere, the article points out that strengthening the U.S. military presence in Oceania will become more and more important. In the intelligence assessment, presenting the key points of Kaplan's article, OPRF has made an analysis of geopolitical implications which China's advance into the oceans involves and connotations to the security of Japan.

1. Information Digest

1.1 Maritime Security

May 1 “French combatant detains pirate group, destroys mother ship” (Maritime Security Centre, Horn of Africa, Press Release, May 2, 2010)

On the 1st, the French navy detained a pirate group two times and destroyed their two mother boats.

Refer to the article: EU NAVFOR's seek, disrupt and destroy policy continues it's success

<http://www.mschoa.org/display.aspx?articlename=375>

May 4 “JMSDF helicopter sights suspected boat in Gulf of Aden, Greek warship tracks skiff” (Maritime Security Centre, Horn of Africa, Press Release, May 4, and MOD, Japan, HP, May 4, 2010)

On the 4th, in the Gulf of Aden a helicopter from the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyer “*Ohnam*” on an escort mission sighted a suspicious skiff with seven persons on board just outside the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC). Upon receipt of information, the Greek naval frigate HS *Elli* stopped the skiff, but its boarding team released the boat after the investigation.

Refer to the article: EUNAVFOR Greek warship ELLI stops pirate skiff in its tracks - Successful cooperation with Japanese Task Force

<http://www.mschoa.org/display.aspx?articlename=376>

MOD, Japan, HP: <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2010/05/04b.html>

May 5 “Somali pirates hijack Russian tanker” (Trade Winds, May 5, 2010)

On the 5th, Somali pirates hijacked the Liberian-flagged tanker MT *Moscow University* (106,500DWT) owned by the Russian shipping company in the Arabian Sea. Carrying crude oil, the tanker was heading from the Red Sea to China.

Refer to the article: Novoship tanker hijacked; Access is available to subscribers only.

【Related Story 1】

“Russian warship frees tanker by force” (Trade Winds, May 6, 2010)

On the morning of the 6th, around 24 hours after MT *Moscow University* was boarded by armed pirates, a Russian antisubmarine destroyer stormed the tanker as it drifted in the Arabian Sea. The warship freed the tanker and arrested the pirates.

Refer to the article: Tanker free after shoot-out; Access is available to subscribers only.

【Related Story 2 】

“Russian navy frees pirate suspects” (Trade Winds, May 7, 2010)

On the 7th, Russian navy set free ten pirate suspects it had captured, embarking them on the skiff. According to the Russian navy source, while the tanker crew was attacked by the pirate suspects, all-Russian crew had managed to lock themselves in a secure compartment onboard, thereby a possible reason for authorities having to free the suspects is that the crew would not have been able to identify them as the attackers if a trial ensued.

Refer to the article: Legal let-off for Novoship ‘pirates’; Access is available to subscribers only.

【Related Story 3】

“Released pirate suspects die after drifting” (RIA Novosti, May 11, 2010)

On the 11th, an official of the Russian Defense Ministry (RDM) told that the 10 pirate suspects who were released 250 nautical miles off Somali coast on the 7th had been disarmed, embarked and sent adrift in a rubber boat without navigation equipment. According to the RDM, the boat reportedly disappeared from radars an hour later and pirates are believed to have died.

Refer to the article: Pirates released after assault operation near Gulf of Aden apparently perished

<http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100511/158968138.html>

Refer to the article: Questions remain over alleged deaths of Somali pirates - Russian media

<http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100512/158986192.html>

May 6 “Somali pirates hijack Taiwan fishing vessel” (Maritime Security, Horn of Africa, Press Release, May 10, 2010)

On the 6th, a Taiwan flagged fishing vessel, FV *Tai Yuan 227*, was hijacked by Somali pirates 700 nautical miles north east of Seychelles. She has a crew of 28 and it is believed that all are well.

Refer to the article Taiwan flagged fishing vessel hijacked

<http://www.mschoa.org/display.aspx?articlename=385>

May 8 “Somali pirates grab German vessel” (Trade Winds, May 8, 2010)

On the 8th, Somali pirates hijacked a chemical tanker (Marshall Islands-flagged), MT *Marida Marguerite* (13,300DWT), 120 miles south of Salalah off the coast of Oman.

Refer to the article: Pirates grab German tanker; Access is available to subscribers only.

May 8 “Somali pirates hijack Yemeni fishing boat” (Trade Arabia, May 8, 2010)

On the 8th, Somali pirates seized a Yemeni fishing boat FV *Al Dhafir* in the Red Sea.

Refer to the article: Somali pirates hijack Yemeni fishing boat

<http://www.tradearabia.com/news/newsdetails.asp?Sn=STN&artid=179384>

May 10 “Somali pirates free Bermuda-flagged ship” (Reuters, May 11, 2010)

On the 10th, Somali pirates released the Bermudan-flagged reefer MV *Talca*. The reefer's 25 crew members were safe. Although how much ransom was paid is unknown, there was a ransom.

Refer to the article: Somali pirates free Bermuda-flagged ship, ransom paid

<http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE64A1V920100511>

May 11 “Somali pirates hijack Bulgarian vessel” (Trade Winds, May 12, 2010)

On the 11th, Somali pirates hijacked a Bulgarian products tanker, MT *Panega*, in the Gulf of Aden. The tanker was en route from the Red Sea to India. There are 15 Bulgarian crew members onboard the vessel.

Refer to the article: Pirates nab 'dead' Bulgarian tanker; Access is available by subscribers only.

May 12 “Somali pirates hijack Greek ship” (Trade Winds, May 12, 2010)

On the 12th, Somali pirates hijacked a Liberian-flagged bulker, MV *Eleni P* (72,100 DWT), 620 miles east of the Somali coast. The bulker was headed from the Ukraine to China with a cargo of iron ore. The bulker has a crew of 23. There are no reported injuries.

Refer to the article: Euroseas bulker hijacked; Access is available to subscribers only.

May 13 “Somali pirates free British ship” (Maritime Security, Horn of Africa, Press Release, May 13, 2010)

On the 13th, a ransom drop was made to the pirate group holding the British-registered chemical tanker MT *St James Park*, and the tanker was released.

Refer to the article: UK flagged chemical tanker released

<http://www.mschoa.org/display.aspx?articlename=388>

May 14 “British warship destroys pirate skiff” (Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom, HP, May 18, 2010)

On the 14th, Royal Navy frigate HMS *Chatham*, currently deployed as NATO's counter-piracy flagship, spotted a larger vessel towing the two attack boats approximately 150 nautical miles off the coast of Tanzania and intercepted it. Having destroyed two attack boats, HMS *Chatham* embarked ten Somalis in the larger boat with only enough fuel to return to Somalia.

Refer to the article: HMS Chatham destroys pirate boats

<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/HmsChathamDestroysPirateBoats.htm>

May 20 “Tanzania agrees to prosecute Somali pirate suspects in the country” (IOL, Reuters, May 20, 2010)

On the 20th, Tanzania said it would prosecute Somali pirates in response to a European Union call for other nations in the region to share the financial and security burden on Kenya and Seychelles. Parliament has already approved necessary amendments to the penal code.

Refer to the article: Tanzania agrees to prosecute Somali pirates

http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=87&art_id=nw20100520152644978C728950

May 25 “1st European trial of Somali pirate suspects starts in Rotterdam” (Fairplay Daily News, May 25, 2010)

On the 25th, first European trial of Somali pirate suspects begun at a court in the Netherlands. The five Somalis were charged with trying to hijack the general cargo ship MV *Samanyolu* under the flag of the Netherlands Antilles in the Gulf of Aden on January 2, 2009.

Refer to the article on the Web site: Pirate trial starts in Rotterdam; Access is available to subscribers only.

May 25 “SA allows ships in Saudi waters to carry arms” (Lloyd’s List, May 25, 2010)

According to a memo from the Saudi coastguard dated April 20, vessels in Saudi Arabian (SA) waters are now allowed to carry weapons for self-defense against piracy, subject to certain restrictions. According to the memo, ship masters are requested to furnish a list of such arms and ammunition prior to arrival in the country, and thereafter keep them in a store sealed until departing the country.

Refer to the article: Ships openly allowed to carry arms in Saudi waters; Access is available to subscribers only.

May 26 “U. S. Navy warship detains 13 pirate suspects” (U.S. Navy News Stand, May 30, 2010)

On the 26th, U. S. Navy’s guided-missile destroyer, USS *San Jacinto* boarded a Yemeni dhow *Al Jawat*, and detained 13 pirate suspects, while conducting maritime interdiction operations 68 miles southeast of Ras Fartak, Yemen.

Refer to the article: US Ship Rescues Yemeni Mariners From Pirates

http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=53739

【Related Story】

“U.S. Navy warship deters pirate attack, release 9 pirate suspects after arrest” (U.S. Navy News Stand, June 1, 2010)

On the 31st, USS *San Jacinto* (CG 56) received a warning of pirate attack from the Mata-flagged vessel which was sailing in the Gulf of Aden 90 nautical miles north of Somali coast. Sending her helicopter, USS *San Jacinto* spotted a small skiff with nine persons onboard, and halted it by warning shots. On the early morning of June 1, the boarding team of USS *San Jacinto* searched a skiff, and investigated the nine pirate suspects. They were later moved to a small boat and released.

Refer to the article: Twice in One Week, USS San Jacinto Disrupts Piracy Off Somalia Coast

http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=53765

May 28 “U.S. Navy releases pirate suspects” (The Washington Post, May 28, 2010)

On the 28th, the U. S. Navy released 10 accused Somali pirates who had been in custody aboard a U.S. warship in the Indian Ocean. These 10 pirates were captured in the Arabian Sea by a U.S. guided missile destroyer, USS *McFaul* (DDG 74) on April 5.

Refer to the article on the Web site: Navy releases accused Somali pirates held on warship for six weeks

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/28/AR2010052804108.html>

May 28 “Somali pirates hijack Yemeni fishing boat” (Maritime Bulletin, Reuters, Saturday, May 29, 2010)

According to Yemen's Interior Ministry, Somali pirates seized a Yemeni fishing boat with nine crew members aboard 130 nautical miles south of the Yemeni island of Socotra. The boat will likely be used by the pirates as a mother ship to launch attacks on other ships in the area around Sokotra.

Refer to the article: Pirates again out-manuevered navies

<http://www.odin.tc/eng/articles/353-Pirates-again-out-manuevered-navies.asp>

May 29 “Seychelles Coast Guard arrests pirate group, releases later” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, May 30, 2010)

On the 29th, the Seychelles Coast Guard detained a Pirate Action Group, including a mother ship with 9 suspected pirates on board and two fast attack skiffs. Nine suspected pirates were disarmed and then embarked in their mother ship (whaler) and released.

Refer to the article: Pirate Action Group disrupted due to excellent cooperation between EU NAVFOR and the Seychelles Coast Guard

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/05/pirate-action-group-disrupted-due-to-excellent-cooperation-between-eu-navfor-and-the-seychelles-coast-guard/>

1.2 Military Development

May 8 “China, Vietnam conduct 9th joint patrol in GOT” (PLA Daily, Net Edition, Sanya, May 9, 2009)

On the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the joint patrol of the Chinese and Vietnamese navies in the Beibu Gulf (Gulf of Tongking), China and Vietnam will conduct the 9th joint patrol of the Chinese and Vietnamese navies in the Gulf of Tongking (GOT). The two navies will also carry out the first joint maritime search and rescue exercises after the completion of the joint patrol in the GOT.

Refer to the article: Original text in Chinese;

http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-05/09/content_27455.htm

May 12 “Feature of Indian shipbuilding: high tech, low cost” (Asia Times Online, May 12, 2010)

On April 29, the Indian navy commissioned its first indigenously manufactured stealth frigate, the Indian Naval Ship (INS) *Shivalik*, and saw the country join a group of eight nations that had built warships with naval stealth technology. Prior to this event, in July 2009, the Indian navy launched its first indigenously built nuclear submarine for sea trials, becoming just the sixth country in the world to build such a vessel. Over the next five to seven years, India will be manufacturing 37 major warships at home. According to Indian journalist Sudha Ramachandran, several of the warships India is building are high-tech and low-cost. However, while India's warships may cost less, some projects have been beset with delays. One of the causes of delay is that Indian shipyards are too slow in production and delivery.

Refer to the article: India Steals a March on the High Seas

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LE12Df04.html

May 13 “Chinese and ROK escort ships hold joint exercise in GOA” (Chinese Navy Fights Pirates HP, May 17, 2010)

On May 13, the escort ships of the Chinese and the Republic of Korea (ROK) naval escort taskforces implementing escort mission in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) and the waters off the Somali coast conducted the first joint exercise in the eastern waters of the GOA. The commanding officers from the two sides took turns to command the joint maritime exercise in different stages.

Refer to the article: Chinese and ROK escort ships hold joint exercise

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/special-reports/2008hjdjhd/2010-05/17/content_4220484.htm

【Related Story】**“Commander of Chinese naval escort taskforce visits ROK escort warship” (MOD, China, HP, May 4, 2010)**

On April 30, two weeks before the exercises between the two nations, Senior Captain Zhang Wendan, commander of the 5th Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce and deputy chief of staff of the South China Sea Fleet under the Navy of the Chinese People's Liberation Army visited Rear Admiral Beom-rim Lee, present commander of the 151 Task Force of the “Multinational Maritime Forces”, and commander of the 7th Maritime Task Force of the Republic of Korea (ROK). During the meeting, the two sides introduced their respective escort situation and anti-pirate measures, explored the current characteristics of pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast and the information exchange. They also exchanged views on such issues as carrying out joint exercise between the Chinese and the ROK naval escort warships.

Refer to the article: Commander of Chinese naval escort taskforce visits ROK escort warship

http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-05/04/content_4152399.htm

May 14 “Vietnam navy to purchase 6 aircraft from Canada” (Vietnam Business, May 14, 2010)

Viking Air of Victoria, British Columbia, has finalized with the Vietnamese navy a purchase agreement for six amphibious DHC-6 Twin Otter Series 400 aircraft. The deal would give Vietnam navy its first fixed wing naval air force, and of six, some are designed specifically for maritime patrol.

Refer to the article: Viking Air says in deal for Vietnam navy aircraft

<http://vietnambusiness.asia/viking-air-says-in-deal-for-vietnam-navy-aircraft/>

May 17 “China’s SSF conduct demagnetization OPS” (PLA Daily, Net Edition, May 17, 2010)

The PLA Daily dated the 17th carried an article of the demagnetization operations (OPS) for a missile destroyer of the South Sea Fleet (SSF) with photographs of the scenes.

Refer to the article on the Web site: Original text in Chinese;

http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-05/17/content_28081.htm

May 19 “Taiwan inaugurates 1st stealth patrol squadron” (Defense News, May 19, 2010)

On the 18th, the Taiwan navy inaugurated its first stealth patrol squadron consisting of ten 170-ton class indigenously-made stealth guided missile patrol boats - *Kuang Hua-6* units at the Tsoying naval base in Kaohsiung City in the southern Taiwan. The navy is to establish three squadrons, each of which is composed of 10 *Kuang Hua-6* units. The bases of other two squadrons are unknown. The rest of 20 boats are expected to be commissioned by 2012.

Refer to the article: Taiwan Commissions First Stealth Patrol Boat

<http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4633230&c=ASI&s=SEA>

May 20 “South Korean navy’s patrol ship ‘Cheonan’ sunk by North Korean torpedo attack: Joint investigation team” (Korean Daily, Japanese Edition, May 20, 2010)

On the 20th, the South Korean joint civilian-military investigation team that had been investigating the sinking of the South Korean navy’s patrol ship “*Cheonan*” officially announced that they reached a conclusion that the ship “was sunk by the attack of a torpedo made by North Korea.” Yoon Duk-yong, co-head of the investigation team said at an interview, “*Cheonan*” was cut by a shock wave and bubble jet effect caused by an underwater explosion by a torpedo and sunk.

Refer to the article: Original text in Japanese;

<http://www.chosunonline.com/news/20100520000037>

May 25 “PLA DCOGS talks with 2 US military leaders in Pacific” (PLA Daily, Net Edition, Beijing, May 26, 2010)

Since China halted military exchange programs between the two countries in protest over the U. S. arms sales to Taiwan, Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of the General Staff (DCOGS) of the

Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) met for the first time with U. S. Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Command Robert Willard and Wallace Gregson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs in Beijing on May 25. Ma said U. S. arms sales to Taiwan and reconnaissance by the U. S. military forces in the Chinese exclusive economic zones (EEZ) are preventing sound developments of military relations between China and the United States.

Refer to the article: Original text in Chinese;

http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-05/26/content_28879.htm

1.3 Maritime Boundaries

May 6 “Vietnam refuted China’s fishing ban in SCS” (Vietnam News Agency, May 7, 2010)

On the 6th, a Vietnamese foreign ministry spokesperson said China's ban on fishing in waters in the South China Sea (called the East Sea in Vietnam), including the areas under Vietnam's sovereignty, is “totally worthless.” (The ban will take effect from May 16-August 1.)

Refer to the article: Vietnam says China's fishing ban in East Sea "totally worthless"

<http://english.vietnamnet.vn/politics/201005/China%E2%80%99s-fishing-ban-in-East-Sea-worthless-says-FM-spokesperson-908436/>

【Related Story】

“Vietnam naval chief assures fishermen protection” (Thanh Nien News, May 28, 2010)

On the 25th, Vietnamese naval commander Nguyen Van Hien asked fishermen to sail out to sea as usual despite China’s ban on fishing in the East Sea. Naval commander said, “The specific means to make sure our fishermen are safe sailing out is that the navy is patrolling closely the waters that fall under Vietnam’s economic privileges.” Hien said Vietnam will intensify patrolling from now on.

Refer to the article: Vietnam naval chief assures fishermen protection

<http://www.thanhniennews.com/2010/Pages/20100528181844.aspx>

May 26 “Japan enacts law to preserve Japan’s EEZ” (Japan Today, Kyodo, May 26, 2010)

On the 26th, a plenary session of the upper house passed unanimously the legislation that the state instead of local authorities shall improve the port facilities in the specific, isolated island which becomes a foothold of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in Japan’s southernmost and easternmost ends and others. The new law is slated to take effect within three months after promulgation.

Refer to the article: Diet enacts law to preserve Japan's EEZ

<http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/diet-enacts-law-to-preserve-japans-eez>

Note: An official appellation of the law is “Law concerning preservation of low tide line and maintenance and others of foothold facilities for protection and promotion of utilization of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf” and, in an abbreviated name, it is called the “law for reservation of the low tide line and maintenance of foothold facilities.”

May 28 “Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stresses sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao” (Xinhua Net, May 28, 2010)

On the 28th, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stressed the Diaoyu Dao (Senkaku Islands in Japanese) and islets attached to it have been a proper territory of China and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty should not cause damage to the interests of the third parties including China.

Refer to the article on the Web site: Original text in Chinese;

http://news.xinhuanet.com/2010-05/28/c_12155186.htm

http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2010-05/28/content_13577097.htm

1.4 Diplomacy and International Relations

May 15 “Chinese FM supports monitoring JCG survey ship by PLAN and its exercises in ECS: Japan-China FMs’talks” (Xinhua, May 15, 2010)

On the 15th, at the 4th Trilateral Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Japan, the People’s Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea held in Korea, Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi had talks and discussed incidents of the pursuit of the JCG ship by Chinese warships and the Chinese naval exercise in the East China Sea.

Refer to the article: Original text in Chinese;

http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-05/15/c_12105744.htm

Regarding “Japan-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Outline” by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, refer to the text below;

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/jck/g_kaigi/jc_1005_gai.html

May 19 “DCOGS Ma Xiaotian addresses at ARF Security Policy Conference” (PLA Daily, May 20, 2010)

Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of general staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), made an address at the meeting of China-ASEAN (10+1) Regional Forum (ARF) which was held in Da Nang, Vietnam on May 19. Ma Xiaotian pointed out that, as non-traditional security threats are sticking out in succession, all the countries in the region should join hands to deal with such threats, and proposed to deepen a system framework of mechanisms of the non-traditional regional security cooperation.

Refer to the article: Ma Xiaotian attends ARF Security Policy Conference
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-05/20/content_4157881.htm

1.5 Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors

May 5 “Tankers make drastic detours to avoid piracy; VLCC transportation costs increasing” (Lloyd’s List, May 5, 2010)

The very large crude oil carriers (VLCCs) with shipments from the Middle East to European and North American destinations are now deviating at least 1,000 nautical miles east of Mombasa, Kenya, to avoid pirates. A distance, which one London-based expert said, was being extended further. Additional costs of transporting crude oil by making such drastic detour routes are estimated to be \$15.6m annually, based on current market spot rates, provoking charter party disputes.

Refer to the article: Tankers make 1,000-mile detours to avoid pirates; Access is available to subscribers only.

May 7 “Indonesia to build large-scale container terminal” (China Shipping, May 10, 2010)

On the 7th, the Indonesian port authority announced its plans to build a new large-scale container port outside Jakarta / Tanjung Priok. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is presently carrying out a feasibility study for the project. Once fully completed, the new port would be able to accommodate large mainline container vessels and provide an annual handling capacity of 10 Million teu.

Refer to the article: Indonesia plans new West Java Port
http://www.cnshipping.com/english/hyxx_detail.asp?id=7532

May 14 “India, Myanmar build port: promotes flow of commodities in NE India” (ESSAR HP, Media Release, May 14, 2010)

On the 14th, Essar Projects (India) Ltd. signed a contract with the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India to execute Port and Inland Water Transport components of the “Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project” to be executed in Myanmar. The contract involves the construction of two jetties at Sittwe and Paletwa in Myanmar, dredging and construction of cargo barges etc. to facilitate cargo movement along the river Kaladan. This project is being executed by the Government of India to ease the movement of goods from mainland India to the North-Eastern states of India. It is to be executed within 36 months.

Refer to the article: Essar wins prestigious infrastructure project in Myanmar
http://www.essar.com/article.aspx?cont_id=ywBmcC5QmHU=

May 25 “Filipino crew sends home 11% more money in 1st qtr of 2010 compared to same period in 2009” (Trade Winds, May 25, 2010)

Filipino seafarers sent home a total amount of \$888.9m in wages in the first quarter of 2010, up 11% compared to the same period of 2009. The top 10 of the countries from which they sent money is: US, Japan, Norway, Germany, UK, Singapore, Greece, the Netherlands, Hong Kong and Cyprus. Of them, six are European countries.

Refer to the article: Filipino crew send home more; Access is available to subscribers only.

1.6 Ocean Resources, Energy, Marine Environment and Others

May 25 “Tanker, cargo ship collide; oil leaks in Singapore Strait” (Maritime Bulletin, May 25, 2010)

On the morning of the 25th, an oil tanker and a bulk carrier collided in the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) of the Singapore Strait. The collision caused a 10-meter gash on the left side of the tanker. The tanker was carrying about 62,000 tons of light crude oil, spilling an estimated 2,500 tons of oil.

Refer to the article: Collision in Singapore Strait, 2,500 mt oil leak

<http://www.odin.tc/eng/articles/344-Collision-in-Singapore-Strait-2500-mt-oil-leak.asp>

2. Intelligence Assessment

A Commentary on the Article: “ The Geography of Chinese Power ” by Robert D. Kaplan

A fleet of ten Chinese naval ships, including submarines, conducted the exercise in the East China Sea and waters west of the Okinotorishima island from early April to sometime after the 20th. The exercise kept attention both at home and abroad. As we discussed it in the April edition of the OPRF MARINT Monthly report, for instance, Abraham Denmark, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) in Washington, DC said, “Reports of a transit by the PLAN forces close to Okinawa only remind US allies in Japan and throughout the Asia-Pacific that China's future course is unclear.” “It is important to retain a military hedge against the possibility that China could become confrontational and militarily aggressive,” said Denmark. Also, pointing out that that China has been developing the unprecedented capabilities of staging combat-operations along the surrounding disputed waters, Associate Professor Andrew Erickson with the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College regards that, in effect, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is now starting to conduct “far seas operations” beyond the so-called “First Island Chain.” In addition to such exercises, as seen in the dispatching of naval vessels to counter piracy off Somalia, the ocean-going activities of the PLAN are becoming noticeable in the recent years.

Under these circumstances, a journalist of the U. S. magazine, *The Atlantic*, and a senior fellow of the CNAS, Robert D. Kaplan, published an interesting article entitled “The Geography of Chinese Power” (hereafter the article) in the U. S. magazine, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June¹. In the article, Kaplan discusses the background of the Chinese advance into the oceans from geo-political points of view. He says that, at present, “a Greater China” is being formed in “the Eastern Hemisphere,” in which the PLAN is a driving force. On the other hand, an expansion of the Chinese influence will be in touch with the Indian and Russian borders, and, above all, with operational areas of the United States Navy in an unstable form. From now on, in order to keep the balance of power in the eastern hemisphere, the article points out that strengthening the U. S. military presence in Oceania will become more and more important.

Presenting the key points of Kaplan’s article, OPRF will discuss geopolitical implications which China’s advance into the oceans involves and connotations to the security of Japan as follows.

1. China’s geopolitical features

Kaplan opens his article by quoting from the English geographer Sir Halford Mackinder who ended his famous 1904 article, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” with a disturbing reference to China. Mackinder posited that the Chinese, should they expand their power well beyond their

¹ Robert D. Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power,” *Foreign Affairs*, May / June, Vol. 89 Issue 3, pp.22-41.

borders, “might constitute the yellow peril to the world's freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the pivot region.” Mackinder pointed out as follows: “Whereas Russia, that other Eurasian giant, basically was, and is still, a land power with an oceanic front blocked by ice, China, owing to a 9,000-mile temperate coastline with many good natural harbors, is both a land power and a sea power.”

According to the article, China's blessed geography is so obvious a point that “it tends to get overlooked in discussions of the country's economic dynamism and national assertiveness.” Moreover, the article asserts that “China has now secured the neighboring borders, and is beginning to show gradually an external orientation,” the motive of which is different from the mission-oriented United States a century ago. The article mentions as follows. “China's action abroad are propelled by its need to secure energy, metals, and strategic minerals,” and “in that sense, China can be defined as an extremely realist power.” However, the article is pointing out that China, as a realist power, which is disregarding the regimes of other countries for worldwide scouring for resources, brings it into conflict with “the missionary-oriented United States, as well as with countries such as India and Russia, against whose own spheres of influence China is bumping up.”

To be sure, China is not “an existential problem” for these states. “The challenge China poses is primarily geographic.” The article mentions the key points as follows.

- (1) China's emerging area of influence in Eurasia and Africa is growing, not in a nineteenth-century imperialistic sense but in a more subtle manner better suited to the era of globalization.
- (2) Simply by securing its economic needs, China is shifting the balance of power in the Eastern Hemisphere, and that must mightily concern the United States.
- (3) On land and at sea, abetted by China's favorable location on the map, Beijing's influence is emanating and expanding from Central Asia to the South China Sea, from the Russian Far East to the Indian Ocean.
- (4) China is a rising continental power, and, as Napoleon famously said, the policies of such states are inherent in their geography.

The article discusses a strategic environment in Central Asia, India, Mongol, Korean Peninsula and Southeast region which border China, and regards that China has no need to be alert to an act of aggression from lands bordering China. Pointing out “Thanks to this favorable situation on land, China is now free to work at building a great navy,” the article discusses the Chinese advance into the oceans which is said to be as the major subject of the article.

2. Products of Chinese Advance into the Oceans

The basic factor that directs the national security strategy of a nation is a geographical position of the country, and no nations can develop their security policies by disregarding their geopolitical factors. As the nations cannot choose the neighboring countries, the geographical position of the nation is an unchangeable factor in the international relations. In this context, China is a continental power which occupies a greater part of the Eurasian continent. On the other hand, the

United States is regarded to be “an insular power of continental size,” which is geopolitically located between the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean². Therefore, the ocean, especially the Pacific Ocean, can be a source of security or insecurity, depending on the balance of naval power. The oceans at both ends of the Eurasian continent are said to be the foremost fronts of the U.S. national security strategy. Japan and Britain are island nations facing the ends of the east and west of the Eurasian continent, which are the allies of the United States in the foremost front.

Looking from the geopolitical structure, the U.S. and China are said to be the relations of maritime power versus continental power facing the Pacific Ocean. In this geopolitical structure, the U.S. has maintained its superiority in the oceans bordering East Asia. On the other hand, China has maintained its superiority in the eastern part of the Eurasian Continent. Basically, the geopolitical structure between the U.S. and China is regarded inherently to have been a stable bipolar structure, so long as two nations respect their mutual spheres of influence divided by the Ocean³. The traditional national interests of the United States in East Asia are securing commercial accesses to these areas as well as freedom of navigation, and preventing the rise of antagonistic hegemony states or powers. In this meaning, the Chinese advance into the oceans which is said to be the major subject of the article will give a serious impact on the strategic environment in the eastern hemisphere.

Regarding the Chinese advance into the oceans, the article is discussing the major points as follows.

- (1) China dominates the East Asian coastline in the temperate and tropical zones of the Pacific, and its southern border is close enough to the Indian Ocean that it might one day be linked to it by roads and energy pipelines. Therefore, China in the twenty-first century will project hard power abroad primarily through its navy.
- (2) However, China faces a far more hostile environment at sea than it does on land. The Chinese navy sees little but trouble in what it calls the “First Island Chain.” Here are many flashpoints, and China is already embroiled in territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea with Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. For Chinese naval strategists, this issue is mostly grim. In the “First Island Chain” there is a kind of “Great Wall in reverse”: a well-organized line of U.S. allies that serve as a sort of guard tower to monitor and possibly block China's access to the Pacific Ocean⁴.

² Collin S. Gray, *The Politics of Super Power* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1988), p. 45

³ Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century,” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 81-118. Although Ross points out Russia and Japan as candidates that would become poles in Asia in addition to two poles of the United States and China, Russia and Japan cannot become poles from their geo-political limitations, although either of them is a power strong enough to give influence upon the regional balance of power.

⁴ In fact, looking at the geography in this region, the front of the Eurasian Continent is rimmed by a chain of continuous island nations, starting from the Japanese Islands in Northeast Asia to Malaysia in Southeast Asia. The United States maintains the treaties or strategic relations of an alliance with all nations around the Continent. Washington has also concluded the defense agreements for an access to naval and air force facilities with Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei. Moreover, the United States concluded the status agreement with the Philippines and restored the US-Philippine military cooperation in February 1998. Under these agreements and with composite base facilities in Japan, particularly in Okinawa, the United States has composed a strong deterrent against the Chinese advance into the oceans.

- (3) China is not as benevolent as other maritime nations before it--Venice, Great Britain, and the United States--and to concern itself primarily, as those powers did, with preserving a peaceful maritime system. But China is not so self-confident. Still an insecure sea power, it thinks about the ocean territorially: the very terms "First Island Chain" and "Second Island Chain" suggest that the Chinese see all these islands as archipelagic extensions of the Chinese landmass.
- (4) In thinking in such a zero-sum fashion about their country's adjoining seas, China's naval leaders are displaying the aggressive philosophy of US naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who argued for sea control and the decisive battle. But they do not yet have the blue-water force to apply it, and this discrepancy between aspirations and means has led to some awkward incidents over the past few years. (The article carries as examples the incidents, in which a Chinese submarine surfaced in the vicinity of the USS *Kitty Hawk* in October 2006, and PLA navy ships harassed the U.S. surveillance ship the USNS *Impeccable* in March 2009.)
- (5) China's assertiveness at sea is also demonstrated by its capital purchases. Beijing is developing asymmetric niche capabilities designed to block the U.S. Navy from entering the East China Sea and other Chinese coastal waters. This, along with China's burgeoning submarine fleet, is designed to eventually deny the U.S. Navy easy access to significant portions of the western Pacific.
- (6) It is still a long way for China from directly challenging the United States militarily. But its aim is to develop such capabilities along its seaboard to dissuade the U.S. Navy from getting between the first island chain and the Chinese coast whenever and wherever it wants. Since the ability to limit one's adversary's behavior is the essence of power, this is evidence that a Greater China is being realized at sea as on land.
- (7) In addition to the Taiwan Strait, the PLAN is projecting more power in the South China Sea (SCS) and the Indian Ocean (IO). The SCS is China's gateway to the IO and to the world's energy transport route. In terms of overall strategic significance, the SCS could become, as some have said, a "second Persian Gulf." Nicholas Spykman, the U.S. scholar of geopolitics, noted that throughout history, states have engaged in "circumferential and transmarine expansion" to gain control of adjacent seas. Greece sought control over the Aegean, Rome over the Mediterranean, the United States over the Caribbean--and now China over the SCS. Spykman called the Caribbean "the American Mediterranean" to underscore its importance to the United States. In the same way, the SCS may become "the Asian Mediterranean" and the heart of political geography in coming decades.

3. Taiwan's Strategic Importance

The article attaches greater importance to the strategic value of Taiwan by mentioning "to the advent of a Greater China is the future of Taiwan." Regarding Taiwan, the article pays attention to the value of Taiwan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" as U.S. General Douglas MacArthur put it. According to the article, Taiwan is an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" midway up China's seaboard. From there, an outside power such as the United States can "radiate" power along

China's coastal periphery. If Taiwan returned to the bosom of mainland China, the Chinese navy not only would suddenly be in an advantageous strategic position vis-à-vis the first island chain but also would be freed up to project power beyond it to an unprecedented degree. The article mentions that only the fusing of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland would mark the real emergence of a multi-polar military order in East Asia.

Regarding Taiwan's strategic importance, Daniel Blumenthal, a fellow of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI), is pointing out that, if current trends of Chinese buildup of missile forces continue, China would not need Taiwan to project power into the Pacific. Based on this, he mentions as follows. "From a geo-strategic perspective, Taiwan would only be important, if the United States decided to use it to counter China's missile or submarine force. But the United States is not doing that now nor is it likely to in the future. Since the United States is decidedly not using Taiwan as its 'unsinkable aircraft carrier,' China does not need to consider it a barrier to its current military planning. Taiwan's geographic importance to China may be overstated."⁵

The article asserts that the United States could then maintain its credibility with its allies by keeping Taiwan functionally independent until China became a more liberal society. It mentions that, if the United States simply abandons Taiwan to Beijing, then Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and other U.S. allies in the Pacific Ocean, as well as India and even some African states, will begin to doubt the strength of Washington's commitments.

If so, what should the United States do? The article is proposing that Washington and Taipei must consider asymmetric ways to counter China militarily, and the aim should be not to defeat China in a war in the Taiwan Strait but to make the prospect of war seem prohibitively costly to Beijing. Although the article does not mention the concrete content, it evaluates the Obama administration's announcement in January 2010 that it would sell \$6.4 billion worth of weapons to Taiwan as thus "vital to the United States' position vis-à-vis China, and in Eurasia overall."

4. How should the U. S. react to China?

Previously, Zbigniew Brzezinski who served as National Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter raised in his book with the title of "*The Grand Chessboard*" in 1999 the problem about "to what extent is the Chinese power expanded in reality, and to what extent can the United States accept it, as China can become a great country with overwhelming power in Asia, and it has growing aspirations for the status of a global power."⁶ After a lapse of ten years since then, and, as the article mentions, under the situation where "a Greater China" is emerging in the eastern hemisphere, the problem raised by Brzezinski is said to have become an imminent issue.

If so, how should the United States react to the expanding Chinese influential zone? The article questions in its conclusion "So can the United States work to preserve stability in Asia,

⁵ Daniel Blumenthal, "China's grand strategy," *Foreign Policy*, April 29, 2010.
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/29/china_s_grand_strategy

⁶ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperative* (New York: Basic Books, 1997) p. 152.

protect its allies there, and limit the emergence of a Greater China while avoiding a conflict with Beijing?" The article is also introducing an interesting plan called the "Garret Plan."

According to the article, this plan, designed by the retired U.S. Marine colonel Pat Garrett, has been making the rounds in the Pentagon, which argues that the United States could "counter Chinese strategic power . . . without direct military confrontation" with a U.S. fleet of just 250 ships (down from the 280 it has now) and a 15 percent cut in defense spending. This plan is significant because it introduces into "the Eurasian equation" the strategic significance of Oceania.

Regarding the Garrett Plan, the article mentions its outline as follows.

- (1) Guam and the Caroline, Marshall, Northern Mariana, and Solomon islands are all U.S. territories, commonwealths with defense agreements with the United States, or independent states that would probably be open to such agreements. Oceania will grow in importance because it is both relatively close to East Asia and outside the zone in which China is eager to deny easy access to U.S. warships. It would be less provocative for the United States to keep bases in Oceania in the future than it has been for it to keep troops in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.
- (2) Under the Garrett's plan, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force could take advantage of Oceania's geography to constitute a "regional presence in being" located "just over the horizon" from the informal borders of a Greater China and the main shipping lanes of Eurasia.
- (3) The Garrett plan also envisions a dramatic expansion of U.S. naval activity in the Indian Ocean. It does not envision enlarging existing U.S. bases, however; it anticipates relying on bare-bones facilities in the Andaman Islands, the Comoros, the Maldives, Mauritius, Réunion, and the Seychelles (some of which are run directly or indirectly by France and India), as well as on defense agreements with Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore. This would ensure free navigation and unimpeded energy flows throughout Eurasia.

The article evaluates the Garrett plan "as it would do away with easy-to-target 'master' bases by both de-emphasizing the importance of existing U.S. bases in Japan and South Korea and diversifying the United States' footprint around Oceania, to secure the freedom of navigation and safety of energy transportation." Additionally, regarding the Garrett plan, the article mentions that "it will be a compromise approach between two options -- between resisting a Greater China at all cost and assenting to a future in which the Chinese navy policed the first island chain." The article estimates this approach under the Garrett plan would ensure that China paid a steep price for any military aggression against Taiwan. It would also allow the United States to scale back its so-called legacy bases on the first island chain but nonetheless allow U.S. ships and planes to continue to patrol the area. Moreover, the article is pointing out that local populations have become less agreeable to the presence of foreign troops in their midst. On the other hand, while the rise of China makes Beijing intimidating and appealing at once, "the United States' hold on the first island chain is beginning to be pried loose anyway, and its bilateral relations with its Pacific allies are becoming complicated." It seems that the article supports the Garrett plan as a compromise approach.

In brief, the Garrett plan is to build a hedge against a Chinese advance into the oceans in Oceania, which is said to be an answer to the afore-mentioned problem proposed by Zbigniew Brzezinski. However, the “over the horizontal presence” envisioned by the Garrett plan is the presence outside the second island chain, and it would be hard to be called “regional presence in being” from a standpoint of Japan and South Korea. If the U. S. military presence be shifted to Oceania, the credibility of the U. S. commitment will be downgraded by U. S. allies in the region along the first island chain led by Japan.

Daniel Blumenthal, a fellow of AEI aforementioned, is raising doubts on the Garrett plan from the U.S. political objectives in Asia. Pointing out several problems in the Garrett plan, Blumenthal mentions as follows. “This plan needs cooperation from many countries, but it is uncertain whether on not all of these countries will cooperate. It would be particularly so after the U. S. forces withdraw from Japan and South Korea. The withdrawal from ‘major bases’ will be regarded as a waning U. S. commitment to its allies. To be sure, while it is true that ‘the First Island Chain’ is becoming less defensible, it is not too late to take prudent steps to reverse this dangerous trend.” As a countermeasure, Blumenthal suggests it may be possible for Japan to deploy, for example, the cruise missiles and the ballistic missiles along the Ryukyu Islands to target Chinese missile launchers. Blumenthal stresses that “until we are convinced, at least, that China becomes a responsible, democratic great power which will not intend to build its own exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or military bloc, the United States should maintain more defensive military presence on the territories of the allied nations as many as possible, so long as we are welcome by regional allies, from both strategic-geographical and geo-political reasons,” as the Asian allies like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are, together with Taiwan, are important geo-politically as well as strategic-geographically.⁷

On the other hand, regarding the U.S. presence in Asia, Walter Lohman, head of Asian Research Center of the Heritage Foundation, also says, “Fortunately, our alliances in Asia do have a real geo-strategic objective: Managing the rise of China.” Additionally, emphasizing the importance of U.S. military presence in Asia, Lohman says “the region wants a (resident) America. It wants a strong America”. According to Lohman, a “resident America” is even good for the Chinese themselves because it precludes some of the most aggressive scenarios in their own development. Lohman stresses that, in order to maintain “resident America” the United States must get its own finances in order, stand by the principles that have made America great, sustain American capacity for high-intensity conflicts, and “look, talk, and behave like a superpower.”⁸

Any way, under the circumstances where a Greater China is appearing, if the U.S. military presence is shifted to “over the horizontal presence,” the cornerstone which supports “the Great Wall” in Northeast Asia and controls the Chinese advance into the oceans will be toppled down. It is because only the United States is a global maritime power with power and credibility to maintain the balance of power against Chinese power that supports two polar structures in East

⁷ Blumenthal, “China’s grand strategy”

⁸ Walter Lohman, “Managing Alliances in an Upside-Down World,” The Heritage Foundation, May 10, 2010 <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/05/Managing-Alliances-in-an-Upside-Down-World>

Asia. Except the United States, no country can replace this role. If the U.S. military presence were to withdraw as “over the horizontal presence,” it would inflict an immeasurable influence on the balance of power between the United States and China and in the region as a whole.

5. Connotations to Security of Japan

Needless to say, the problem raised by Zbigniew Brzezinski aforementioned is an imminent issue not only for the United States but also for Japan.

The Japan-US alliance guarantees the U.S. military presence in the eastern part of the Eurasian Continent which is the foremost front for the United States. Japan must be a stable support base which has highly technological and human resources in order that the United States should maintain the military presence. Also, looking from geo-political points, there is no other country that is able to attain this function in this area, and Japan as an anchor which is situated in the east side of the Eurasian Continent is, together with the United Kingdom in the West, remains an essential existence for the United States as a global sea power. Therefore, provision of a stable base foundation in the foremost line of the United States is extremely important not only for the defense of Japan under the Japan-US alliance as a matter of course but also for the peace and stability in East Asia.

The Japan-US alliance must have a function as a hedge against a rise of China. “To how much scope can the United State and Japan accept an expansion of China?” At interview with Yoichi Funabashi, chief editor of *The Asahi Shimbun*, Kaplan said, “U. S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently said that the balance of power is a thing of the past. But I think Asia is now entering the golden age of balance of power politics in Asia because you have Japan, South Korea, India, China, Australia, either enlarging their naval fleets or modernizing them or continuing to modernize them. Japan which has a great navy is going to play a major role in the balance of power in the region.”⁹

In his article, Kaplan stresses an importance of the balance of power in Asia. Japan will be required to realize that it is already taking responsibility for it, and to participate positively in playing a major role in maintaining the balance of power in this region.

(By Hideshi UENO, editorial staff of OPRF MARINT Monthly Report)

⁹ Interview with Robert Kaplan / YOICHI FUNABASHI, Editor in Chief: China, India to compete over various interests in Indian Ocean, *THE ASAHI SHIMBUN*, May 22, 2010
<http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201005210394.html>

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